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This thesis investigates variation in human cooperative behaviour in naturally occurring 
contexts. I critically assess the prevailing consensus on human cooperation derived from 
laboratory games (such as the dictator and public goods games), by identifying real life 
analogues and conducting extensive field observation and experiments. My second chapter 
investigates the importance of context on social behaviour by taking a commonly used 
laboratory game, the dictator game, and studying analogous behaviour, giving to mendicants 
in the street. I conclude that individuals cooperate less in the wild than they do in the 
laboratory and that monetary pay-offs are important in cooperative decision-making. My 
third chapter examines how social cues influence peoples’ likelihood of giving to 
mendicants. I conclude that increased group size and crowd density negatively affect 
donation behaviour. My fourth chapter investigates dog fouling in public parks to understand 
the causes of variation in cheating in a naturally occurring public goods game. I conclude 
that despite evidence that a social game is being played, the cues that influences decisions 
are unclear, and behaviour may depend on local social norms. My fifth chapter investigates 
social influences on red light jumping by cyclists at pedestrian crossings. I find that the 



















This thesis addresses the topics around what drives people to cooperate, or help, one another. 
This is not a simple problem. Evolutionary theory expects people to behave selfishly. 
Cooperation poses a problem because at the moment that someone decides to cooperate with 
another person they may not know whether that help will be repaid. This topic has often been 
investigated by recruiting participants to play simple games in laboratories. This approach is 
problematic for several reasons: (1) People are intensely aware of when they are under 
observation and change their behaviour; (2) People change their behaviour when they know 
they are in an experiment; (3) It doesn’t cost anything to take part in an experiment, so the 
decisions participants make aren’t “real”; (4) There is a bias towards students taking part in 
these experiments instead of the general population. 
My second chapter addresses this by taking one of games that is commonly used in the 
laboratory, the dictator game, and running experiments in a naturally occurring analogue of 
this game: pedestrians giving to individuals begging in the street. I found that people give 
less frequently in this context. I also found that they give more frequently if they have just 
found some money and most frequently if you stop people in the street and invite them to 
play the dictator game as you would in the laboratory. 
My third chapter extends this study by asking what other social factors influence how people 
make decisions about giving in the street. I conclude that pedestrians’ group size and crowd 
density are important. With people giving most frequently when they are on their own, and 
when the density of pedestrians is lower. 
My fourth chapter looks at a different cooperative game, the public goods game. In these 
games, individuals must pay a cost to participate but all participants gain the benefit of this 
participation. The real life situation I used was dog poo in public parks, where individual dog 
walkers pay the cost of picking up poo but all park users gain the benefit of this behaviour. I 
conclude that whilst it seems that there is public goods game being played in parks, the cues 
that people use to decide whether to pick up aren’t clear and might depend on long standing 
local habits. 
My fifth chapter looks at a different public goods game, cyclists jumping red lights. I found 
that cyclists were influenced by the density of pedestrians around them and jumped more 
frequently when there were fewer pedestrians. Cyclists also influenced each other’s 
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1.1 Thesis Rationale 
The success of humans, as a species, depends in large part to our ability to cooperate with 
one another in a complex way (Dunbar, 2003). Humans are unusual in that society is 
characterised by cooperation between non-relatives on a large scale (Melis and Semmann, 
2010). There is, however, substantial variation in the intensity and stability of this 
cooperation, for example, people regularly break the law (Harcourt, 1998). The causes of this 
variation are not fully understood (Holland et al. 2012; Burton-Chellew & West 2013; West 
et al. 2007). Studying human cooperation is therefore interesting both from an academic 
point of view but also from a practical one. Understanding the mechanisms that stabilise 
cooperation could help resolve situations where cooperation breaks down.  
1.1.1 Why study cooperation? 
 
Cooperative behaviour can be found at all biological levels (West et al. 2007). For example, 
the interaction of slime moulds with one another to produce fruiting bodies, the interaction of 
genes on the genome to promote each others propagation, the look-out behaviour of 
meerkats for predators and food sharing amongst primates (Jaeggi and Van Schaik, 2011; 
Santema and Clutton-Brock, 2013; Santorelli et al., 2013; Penny, 2015). In a behavioural 
ecological framework cooperation can be defined as any interaction that provides a net 
benefit to all interactants as opposed to altruism where one individual pays a net cost to 
benefit others (Trivers 1971; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003). Cooperative interactions can be 
divided into two main classes when we consider the benefits and costs at the moment of 
interaction: mutualism and conditional cooperation. In a mutualism all interactants have an 
immediate positive pay-off and there is no opportunity or incentive for individuals to cheat. 
In conditional cooperation interactants have an opportunity to cheat, for example, there may 
be a time delay between each interactants cooperative action In conditional cooperation even 
if both interactants’ ultimately gain a net benefit, the opportunity for cheating can allow a 
cooperative interaction to turn into a selfish one (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). The 
mechanisms that stabilise conditional cooperation allow individuals to monitor each others 
behaviour and maintain net pay-offs such that they are positive for all interactants (West et 
al. 2007).  
The mechanisms that stabilise conditional cooperation include kin selection, when 
individuals are related to one another they can gain indirect genetic benefits by cooperating 
with one another (Clutton-Brock, 2002; Rumbaugh et al., 2012). Between non-relatives the 
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key mechanisms for stabilising conditional cooperation are reciprocity, you scratch my back 
and I’ll scratch yours, and punishment of uncooperative behaviour. 
The terms cooperation and altruism are widely used by different fields and lay people. There 
is a swathe of different meanings for both words depending on what discipline you look to. 
For example, within social psychology the term cooperation is used to describe the majority 
of “helping” behaviours regardless of whether these fit into the slightly more constrictive 
definition outlined above (Levine et al., 1994). Similarly altruistic behaviour is often 
regarded by sociologists as any behaviour where an individual imposes any type of cost on 
themselves in order to help regardless of the net outcome, much as I have described 
conditional cooperation above. In this thesis I will use the terms altruism and cooperation to 
describe the net costs and benefits to an organism. An altruistic behaviour being one where 
an organism ends with a net cost by helping and a cooperative one being when an organism 
ends with a net benefit, even if they impose costs on themselves to ultimately gain this 
benefit.  
The theoretical construct of the public goods game underlies a huge proportion of 
cooperative behaviour. A public goods game describes a situation where individuals 
contribute to a common cause which benefits all group members, providing an incentive to 
cheat. Cooperation disintegrates rapidly when repeated public goods games are played 
between non-relatives in the laboratory, except where individuals can punish one another, or 
their reputation is at stake (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). 
1.2 Why people? 
1.2.1 Extent and sophistication of human cooperative behaviour. 
 
People are a unique example of extreme cooperative behaviour (Melis and Semmann, 2010). 
However, people are characterised by their sociality (Dunbar, 2003). Whilst the reasons for 
the evolution of this sociality are the same that drive sociality in other species, the sociality 
that people exhibit is ubiquitous and complex (McNally, Brown and Jackson, 2012). Many 
authors have argued that people owe their evolutionary success and large population size to 
their ability to work together (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). The development of language has 
been cited as a facilitator of complex social interactions and as method by which people can, 
share information about others reputations through gossip and assess reliability of potential 
co-operators (Dunbar, 2003). 
People are also interesting for their propensity to engage in both one shot and repeated 
cooperation with non-relatives (Rachlin and Jones, 2008; Raihani and Bshary, 2015). One-
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shot cooperative behaviour with non-relatives can present a dilemma, these interactions are 
very common, individuals may not both immediately receive a pay-off and yet human 
society is largely stable (Boyd et al., 2003). One off cooperative interactions include many 
transactional interactions such as paying a bus fare. The reasons that people do cooperate in 
these instances tend to be because they are enshrined in law or local social norms such that 
people know that they will be punished if they do not cooperate or may lose out on future 
cooperative interactions in the instance of social norms (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 
2004). Despite these structures there is variation in human cooperative behaviour. 
Individuals do break the law and do not always abide by local social norms (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004; Johnson et al., 2011). Asking what causes this variation in people’s 
cooperative decision-making is therefore an interesting avenue for research. 
1.2.2 What forms human cooperation takes. 
 
We describe cooperation using several theoretical frameworks. One of the most common is 
the public goods game. In single shot public goods games, the proportion of individuals 
choosing to contribute is unexpectedly high. Both evolutionary and economic explanations 
of human behaviour suggest that rational selfish actors should not contribute in such games 
(Levitt and List, 2008). The principal mechanism that explains high cooperation in both 
single shot games and the early rounds of iterated games is that individuals cooperate 
conditionally and adjust their strategy over time (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001; 
Kocher et al., 2008). So, although cooperation in a single shot games appears irrational, 
subjects are learning how to play and strategise more rationally. Most empirical observations 
of public goods games do not produce results that are consistent with either economically 
optimal behaviour (invest all your endowment), or the Nash equilibrium of invest nothing 
(Isaac and Walker, 1988; Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001). This game theoretic 
optimum of defection may only be a solution for public goods dilemmas that reward 
defection, including the prisoners’ dilemma. This may explain some of the variation in 
investment in public goods dilemmas by experimental subjects, however, there is currently 
little agreement as to what other alternative explanations are important.  
The theoretical structure of a public good game underlies many real life interactions but 
research on how people cooperate in real life situations is minimal (Levitt et al., 2007). One 
study showed a correlation between how much people contributed to a laboratory game and 
the gauge of fishing net they used, suggesting that there is a cooperative personality (Fehr 
and Leibbrandt, 2011). Other studies have not shown these within individual effects and 
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suggest that context is more important in decision-making (Thøgersen, 2008). There can be 
an interaction between public and private goods. If individuals have a long term stake in or 
ownership of part of a public good, this can motivate them to address more heavily in it and 
resolve the dilemma (Hardin, 1968). There is a paucity of studies that address what cues 
individuals use to make decisions in real life public goods dilemmas. 
There are several other economic games that behavioural economists use in the laboratory as 
analogues for cooperative behaviour. The simplest of these is the dictator game (Levitt and 
List, 2007). In this game one experimental subject is given an endowment by the 
experimenters. The subject is then given the opportunity to split this endowment with 
another anonymous unrelated individual. This game was initially devised as a three person 
game to test fairness norms but has gone on to be used extensively as a measure of prosocial 
behaviour (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986; Engel, 2011). The general finding from 
laboratory studies of dictator games is that people are more prosocial than theory would 
predict (Levitt et al., 2007; Engel, 2011). About half of subjects choose to split their 
endowment (Engel, 2011). There are several other factors that have been shown to affect 
cooperation in dictator games including reputational effects and the size of pay-off that 
subjects receive (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Dana, Cain and Dawes, 2006; Brosig-Koch, 
Riechmann and Weimann, 2017).  
Other games that have been used to study cooperative behaviour in humans include the 
ultimatum game, trust game, snowdrift and staghunt game (Levitt et al., 2007; Melis and 
Semmann, 2010). Whilst results from these games all continue the theme of unexpected 
prosocial behaviour in the laboratory, I will not discuss them further here. 
 
1.2.3 How human cooperation is maintained. 
 
The mechanisms that maintain cooperation can be divided into two main groupings: 
Mutualisms and Conditional Cooperation. 
1.2.3.1 Mutualisms 
  
A mutualism describes a situation where all interacting parties obtain a benefit. There is no 
dilemma associated with mutualisms as all parties that engage in the interaction obtain an 
immediate net gain (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007). Examples of mutualisms include 
coordinated hunting by different species. For example, groupers and giant Moray eels hunt 
together in the Red Sea and obtain higher yields than they would do on their own (Bshary et 
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al., 2006). In this instance the co-operators are not related to one another but both gain an 
instant benefit of increased hunting success by working together.  In human populations 
mutualistic interactions would describe any similar interaction, for example, the theoretical 
stag hunt game describes where to catch a valuable prey item you need a certain number of 
hunters (Fang et al., 2002; Duguid et al., 2014). If hunters do not co-ordinate they can only 
acquire lower value prey items, this type of interaction has been observed in natural systems, 
for example in subsistence sperm-whale hunting in Indonesia (Alvard and Nolin, 2002). A 
more pertinent example for modern humans is social prestige. If a wealthy benefactor 
publicly donates to a charitable cause then the charity receives a financial benefit whilst the 
benefactor gains a charitable reputation (Sylwester and Roberts, 2010; Bonini, Court and 
Marchi, 2014). Whilst mutualisms occur in human society they pose less of a theoretical 
problem to be explained than conditional cooperation. 
1.2.3.2 Conditional Cooperation: Reciprocity and Reputation 
Reciprocity describes “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” interactions, where one 
individual does something to benefit another and the recipient of that action repays this (R. 
L. Trivers, 1971). In reciprocal interactions there is a time delay between the two actions 
which open them up to the possibility of cheating (Ghoul et al., 2014). For reciprocity to be 
stable individuals must cooperate conditionally with individuals that they believe will repay 
their initial investment but not with those who cheat (Stuart A West, Griffin and Gardner, 
2007). In order for individuals to acquire reliable information as to whether or not their 
cooperating partner is reliable, reputational information is important.  To retain a good 
cooperative reputation we might expect individuals to engage in activities that maintain this 
reputation. For example, people adjust their behaviour to be more cooperative when they are 
aware that they are under observation (Yoeli et al., 2013). People will also behave more 
cooperatively when they receive gentle proxies of observation like posters with eyes on them 
(Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bateson, Nettle and Roberts, 2006). 
Cooperation can be mediated by immediate direct interactions between individuals but also 
through indirect interactions via third parties. Indirect reciprocity describes where an 
individual performs a costly behaviour for a recipient who is part of a group, one of whom 
ultimately performs a costly behaviour for the original actor (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). 
To avoid being cheated in indirect interactions people use reputations to assess likelihood of 
defection in these cooperative decisions (Boone & Buck, 2003; Gintis & Fehr, 2012;). The 
importance of indirect reciprocity in human cooperation is demonstrated by the behavioural 
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shift towards elevated cooperation when people are aware they are being observed (Bateson, 
Nettle and Roberts, 2006; Yoeli et al., 2013).  
Indirect reciprocity can be mediated through group membership so individuals cooperate 
more with individuals in their group in the expectation that they will be repaid (Nowak, 
2006). The existence of inter-group competition can stabilise in-group cooperation and 
groups with higher in-group cooperation may outcompete other groups (Puurtinen and 
Mappes, 2009). There is evidence that there is a limit to the number of individuals that 
people can recall reputational information about and that this number correlates with tribe 
size in hunter-gatherer societies (Dunbar, 1993; Mac Carron, Kaski and Dunbar, 2016). In-
group interaction may be an important mechanism by which individuals cooperate 
conditionally. One facet of group behaviour can be local social norms, where individuals in 
the same location behave similarly (Ostrom, 2000; Fowler and Christakis, 2010). This type 
of in-group behaviour may be the basis of social contagion where individuals copy behaviour 
from others that they see (Christakis and Fowler, 2010; Lacetera, Macis and Mele, 2015). 
The conditional nature of most cooperation may explain why social contagion is not 
universal (Tsvetkova and Macy, 2014).     
1.2.3.3 Conditional Cooperation: Punishment 
Punishment goes further than reciprocity as cheats lose out not only on future interactions 
but also experience an immediate direct cost (Boyd et al., 2003; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 
1995). Punishment is a universal feature of human society (Henrich et al., 2006). In 
economic laboratory games the possibility of punishment maintains cooperation in both one-
shot games and over multiple iterations (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Gächter, Renner and 
Sefton, 2008). In these games cooperating individuals are able to immediately impose a cost 
on defectors. Cooperation is only maintained in treatments where participants are allowed to 
punish (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Punishing defection appears to be more effective than 
rewarding cooperative behaviour (Gächter, 2012). In most laboratory games punishment is 
also costly to the punisher so is often termed altruistic punishment (Boyd et al., 2003). 
Punishment behaviour can be viewed as coercion where punished individuals act to 
minimise their costs (El Mouden, West and Gardner, 2010; Raihani, Thornton and Bshary, 
2012). This could explain why cooperation is seen in one-shot interactions between unrelated 





1.3 What are the problems with the status quo? 
1.3.1 Conceptual Problems 
 
Human cooperative behaviour appears to be context-dependent and the majority of current 
research, whilst often acknowledging this, fails to address it (Slovic, 1995; Hoeffler and 
Ariely, 1999). The body of work initiated by modern behavioural economists, whilst giving 
us insight into relatively subtle determinants of our behaviour, frequently fails to 
acknowledge that pay-offs associated with behaviour will often strongly drive decision-
making (Burton-Chellew and West, 2013). Evolutionary and economic theory both suggest 
that we would expect individuals to change their behaviour when the associated pay-offs 
change (Gintis, 2000; Hamilton, 1964). This problem of context dependence cuts in two 
ways: 1) It makes it impossible to generalise from lab experiments; 2) It may drive a great 
deal of currently unexplained variation in cooperative behaviour.  
A second problem is that the majority of laboratory models are unrealistic. We have little 
quantitative evidence of whether or not the types of structures studied by behavioural 
economists relate to how people behave in real life. Structures like the dictator game, whilst 
useful models, seem very unlike the majority of real life interactions. Indeed this lack of 
similarity might explain the lack of rigorous studies on these types of games in naturally 
occurring situations. In short, we have limited quantitative evidence that these structures are 
actually how people behave in real life.  
Finally, there is a tension amongst human behavioural scientists about the most appropriate 
way to collect and analyse data. Within psychology there is a phenomenon that has become 
known as the replication crisis, where researchers have been unable to replicate each others 
work, suggesting that there is a bias towards false positives (Earp and Trafimow, 2015). This 
problem certainly runs more widely in science than the study of human behaviour (Schooler, 
2014). It has led to calls both for more rigorous experimental design and pre-registration of 
studies and more rigorous analysis and statistics. Whilst this will certainly go some way to 
improve scientific rigour this problem is a difficult one in a field which is characterised by 
its diversity of research approaches. For example, fitting the ethnographical approach of 
many anthropologists into such a framework is simply inappropriate. In my studies I aim to 





1.3.2 Empirical Problems 
Research has tended to rely on laboratory studies because it allows investigators to control 
the environment (Levitt & List, 2007). However, human behaviour is generally sensitive to 
contextual cues, meaning that the laboratory environment may alter cooperative behaviour 
(Haley and Fessler, 2005). Therefore there is a need to investigate cooperation in a field 
environment (Rankin, 2011) .  
People in an experimental situation tend to behave in a way that they believe the 
experimenter wants (the experimental demand effect) (Barmettler, Fehr and Zehnder, 2012). 
Furthermore, when people know they are being observed they tend to behave more 
cooperatively (Bateson, Nettle and Roberts, 2006). Just the perception of being watched can 
change behaviour (Nettle, Nott and Bateson, 2012). Multiple examples suggest that when 
individuals are monitored they tend to work harder (Levitt and List, 2007). These 
behavioural shifts prevent accurate quantification of naturalistic cooperation. 
Economic games carry no real risk and are inherently profitable as participants tend to be 
given their initial endowment. Many different economic games with varying pay offs are 
used (Rankin, 2011). There is sometimes a theoretical basis for the payoff, however this is 
rarely justified (Burton-Chellew and West, 2013). Generalising results from these studies is 
flawed by the combination of a lack of real costs and rationale for varying payoffs. 
There is debate over the roles that between and within-culture variation play (Lamba and 
Mace, 2011; Henrich et al., 2012). Cross-cultural analyses establish if laboratory results are 
generalizable when laboratory groups with different background cultures are used. High 
levels of cross-societal variation in punishing behaviour have been observed (Herrmann, 
Thöni and Gächter, 2008). The majority of studies of cooperation between non-relatives tend 
to use western undergraduates or online populations as their subjects. There has been little 
work examining whether this groups are representative (Benz and Meier, 2008). Absence of 
cross-cultural studies undermines much work in this field. 
The problems with much of the theoretical and experimental work on human cooperation 
means that there is a need for experiments which replicate the structure of economic games 
in a naturalistic environment. Such experiments will establish if the conclusions drawn from 
laboratory studies of cooperation can be generalised to the real world and furthermore where 




1.4 What do we do? 
I will address these problems by using a number of easily observed naturally occurring 
examples of cooperation, where it is unclear what drives cooperative and cheating behaviour.  
In chapter two I will rigorously critique standard laboratory experiments. The simplest 
laboratory experiment is the dictator game where an experimental subject is given a small 
endowment and is invited to split this with an unrelated anonymous individual. I will use a 
simple but common analogue, pedestrians donating money to individuals begging on the 
street. Such individuals will be referred to as mendicants. I will critically assess the common 
laboratory finding that experimental subjects are highly prosocial by carrying out a number 
of experiments. I will compare the rate of donation in the street to the rate of donation in the 
laboratory. As laboratory subjects are normally given small endowments I will run a second 
study where I assess how much loose change pedestrians carry. I will then run an experiment 
where I give pedestrians endowments by dropping small sums of money in the street and 
recording pedestrians’ donations make after picking this up. I will also run a laboratory style 
dictator game with pedestrians by stopping them in the street. 
In chapter three I will extend this study of street dictator games. As most studies of dictator 
games occur in a laboratory context their scope to examine how social factors influence 
giving behaviour is limited. I will make a number of predictions about what influences 
pedestrians’ donation behaviour based on the theory outlined above. I will ask whether the 
level of reciprocity in an interaction influences donation frequency. For example, do 
pedestrians give more to buskers than mendicants. I will also ask whether a number of 
reputational factors influence giving behaviour, for example, does group size or density of 
pedestrians influence donation frequency? I will also ask whether there are any sex 
differences in giving behaviour.   
 In chapter four I will study a naturally occurring public goods game, dog fouling in public 
parks. This easily observable, tractable system is an example of a public goods game as 
cooperation is costly at the individual level but benefits all park users. This system is 
particularly useful as it is possible to observe the level of cooperation, by assessing the 
amount of dog faeces present, without actually observing any individuals behaviour. I will 
ask firstly if property ownership affects how individuals make faeces abandonment 
decisions. We might expect that in areas with higher property ownership individuals will be 
more likely to cooperate as they have a greater stake in the upkeep of the area. I will also ask 
if the level of observation that individuals experience influences abandonment behaviour. I 
will go on to ask if dog walkers are sensitive to others behaviour in their abandonment 
20 
 
decisions in this social dilemma by running an experiment where I manipulate the apparent 
level of dog faeces in the parks. 
In chapter five I will use a second naturally occurring public goods game, cyclists at red 
lights. One of the strengths of the dog faeces study is that it is possible to measure 
cooperation without having to observe any individual decision-making. However, it is 
possible that an individual’s context at the moment of decision-making is more important 
than general environmental variables. This study aims to address this. Jumping red lights is a 
public goods game as the time and energetic cost of cooperating accrues to individual 
cyclists whilst the benefit accrues to all road users. I will ask questions drawn from the 
theory discussed above as to whether the level of observation cyclists experience will change 
their likelihood of jumping and whether cyclists are influenced by the behaviour of other 




















































The frequency with which humans cooperate with anonymous non-relatives is an 
evolutionary conundrum, yet it is clearly fundamental to the existence and stability of human 
societies (Dunbar, 2003). Given the ubiquity of cooperative behaviour it is important to 
understand what mechanisms drive and maintain it (Stuart A. West, Griffin and Gardner, 
2007). Any modern scientific investigation requires a rigorous empirical framework 
grounded in robust theoretical predictions (Earp and Trafimow, 2015). In order to understand 
this behaviour we therefore need: (i) A simplified, quantifiable framework that is empirically 
tractable and replicable; (ii) To remove assumptions and investigate what people actually do; 
and (iii) To have a basis in theory. Behavioural economists have achieved this by using 
economic games with a simplified pay off structure in a laboratory setting (Levitt & List, 
2007). The results of these studies show that people are unexpectedly cooperative with one 
another. This has led to an underexamined consensus that people are highly prosocial 
(Wilson, O’Brien and Sesma, 2009). Laboratory games have several flaws: (i) People change 
their behaviour under observation; (ii) The experimental context itself can cause changes in 
behaviour; (iii) The pay-offs associated with experimental decision making aren’t real; (iv) 
There is often a recruitment bias (Benz and Meier, 2008; Barmettler, Fehr and Zehnder, 
2012; Burton-Chellew and West, 2013; Yoeli et al., 2013). In order to critically evaluate this 
consensus of prosociality, it is therefore necessary to test the generalisability of laboratory 
games by identifying naturally occurring analogues and investigating whether people behave 
in similar ways.  
One of the canonical games used by behavioural economists is the dictator game, which was 
developed by Kahneman to investigate fairness norms (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 
1986). Kahneman et al. influentially concluded that people do not behave as ‘rational’ 
economic optimisers. The, now standard, format of the dictator game is that there are two 
players, a dictator and a recipient. These players are normally anonymous and unrelated to 
one another, although there are exceptions to this (Hoffman, Mccabe and Smith, 1996; 
Charness and Gneezy, 2008). The dictator is given an endowment and decides whether or 
not to share it, and how much to transfer to a recipient. If we assume that people are rational 
economic actors then we would hypothesize that the majority of participants would transfer 
nothing, however this is not what happens (Levitt & List, 2007). A relatively recent review 
showed that 40-60% of individuals choose to transfer part of their endowment to a recipient 
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and that on average they transfer 20-30% of their initial endowment; this result is supported 
by a recent meta-analysis (Engel, 2011).  
The dictator game has several potential flaws as a model for studying cooperative behaviour. 
They appear to be very unrealistic. The scenario for a subject of being asked a question about 
sharing small sums of money in a laboratory is not one that the majority of subjects will be 
familiar with in their day to day lives (Burton-Chellew & West, 2012; Levitt, & List, 2007). 
Given this, identifying naturally occurring analogues is a challenge (Burton-Chellew, El 
Mouden and West, 2016). In order to identify a rigorous analogue of the dictator game we 
need to be explicit about exactly what this interaction is. A dictator game describes a 
situation where an individual is invited to split an endowment with an unrelated, anonymous 
individual (Engel, 2011). Precisely this happens when pedestrians are being asked for change 
by mendicants in the street. 
There has been limited investigation of donations to mendicants in the street, what there is 
has focussed on public perceptions of these individuals and their companion animals and on 
self-reporting of charitable behaviour (Lankenau, 1999; Kane, Green and Jacobs, 2010; 
Irvine, Kahl and Smith, 2012). One study suggested that the presence of panhandling in the 
US had a very limited effect on the public’s attitude and behaviour towards mendicants (Lee 
and Farrell, 2003). In another study students were more likely to donate to a busker if they 
had previously donated to a mendicant, however, this study measured donation by self-
reporting (Lemay and Bates, 2013). A further study linked perception and donation 
behaviour by asking whether mendicants with humorous signs received more donations; the 
reverse was found to be true (Boster et al., 2016). There is one sociological study which 
examines specific interactions between mendicants and pedestrians and uses this to draw 
conclusions about the reciprocal nature of these interactions (Llewellyn, 2011). This study is 
marred by a small sample size and an entirely descriptive approach. Overall, I have not 
found any studies addressing the actual behaviour of individuals giving money to mendicants 
on a scale comparable to the present study. 
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that people change their cooperative decisions 
when they are aware that they are under observation. The effect of “seeing eyes” has been 
well documented. When posters of both eyes and flowers were positioned next to an honesty 
box in a university tea room on alternate weeks, the rate of payment was higher when there 
were eyes (Bateson, Nettle and Roberts, 2006). This effect has been replicated causing 
decreases in both dog fouling and bike theft (Nettle, Nott and Bateson, 2012; Keep Britain 
Tidy, 2014). I demonstrate in chapters 3 and 5 that people are sensitive to crowd density 
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when making cooperative decisions. This suggests that people care about what others think 
of their external image score or reputation (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind, 2000). I 
predict that people will behave more cooperatively when they are aware that they are under 
observation. 
There is also evidence that individuals are sensitive to the laboratory context. One prior 
study has been carried out on a naturalistic dictator game. In this study, which took place in 
Las Vegas, experimental subjects at a bus stop were given a small number of gaming chips 
by an individual who claimed to be in a rush to get to the airport. There was always an 
experimental stooge loitering nearby. There were two treatments in the study: (i) The focal 
individual was given the chips by experimenter; (ii) The focal individual was given the chips 
by the experimenter who then suggested sharing them with the stooge. In contrast to the 
standard laboratory result none of the experimental subjects chose to split their endowment 
(Winking and Mizer, 2013). Not dissimilarly, differences in framing of experimental games 
can cause behaviour change. For example, in one study two groups of subjects played 
identical games called the “community” and “wall street” games. Those in the community 
game cooperated more than those in the wall street game, suggesting that subjects are 
sensitive to their experimental context (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; List, Berrens, 
Bohara, & Kerkvliet, 2004). The most extreme examples of this can be seen in the Milgram 
and Stanford Prison Experiment (Milgram, 1963; Haney, Banks and Zimbardo, 1973). In the 
former, subjects believed that they were inflicting extreme amounts of pain on other 
experimental subjects under the instructions of the experimenter, whilst in the latter subjects 
behaving as “guards” exacted extreme punishment behaviour on subjects behaving as 
“prisoners”. These studies all reveal that the experimental context is a highly specific one 
and individuals’ cooperative decision-making may not generalise to normal life. I predict 
that when subjects are aware that they are in an experimental context they will behave more 
cooperatively.  
Traditional economic theory assumes that people are rational economic actors who act to 
maximise their economic reward (Levitt and List, 2008). There is a well-established body of 
literature that suggests that this is not how people make decisions (Rankin, 2011). The 
standard laboratory dictator game is a classical piece of evidence for this. Further evidence 
that people are not rational economists comes from a study where individuals are put under 
time pressure to make cooperative decisions. Those under time pressure give away more of 
their endowment, suggesting that thinking about cooperation may carry a cognitive load 
(Rand, Greene and Nowak, 2012). Not dissimilarly, the discounting effect describes a 
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situation where people value money in the future less than they do money now (Critchfield 
and Kollins, 2001). A further example of economic irrationality is how people spend 
windfalls. One study shows that people who did not anticipate a windfall go on to gamble 
more compared to controls, whilst an online study showed that people spend windfalls on 
groceries they would not normally purchase (Nash, Siegel-Jacobs and Stone, 1994; Milkman 
and Beshears, 2009). One anthropological study on the Amazonian Tsimane suggested that 
subjects share large windfalls more readily than small ones and that items with a higher level 
of acquisition variance are shared more readily (Gurven, 2004). These results lead me to 
predict that people will behave more cooperatively when they receive experimental 
windfalls.   
In this chapter I will use the context of pedestrians giving money to mendicants in the street 
to ask if it is possible to generalise results from the laboratory dictator game to other 
contexts. I will observe the rate at which pedestrians give to mendicants and carry out 
several experiments where I give pedestrians small endowments. I hypothesise that 
pedestrians will give at a lower rate in the street context compared to the laboratory. I will 
anonymously give pedestrians small windfalls and predict that they will give more 
frequently when they are playing with these windfalls. I will also carry out an experiment 
were I stop pedestrians and invite them to play a formal dictator game on an iPad, I predict 
that this experiment will recapitulate the common lab result.  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Observational Methods 
 
Between 16/06/2014 and 25/02/2015 I observed 44493 pedestrians walking past focal 
mendicants in in five UK cities: Edinburgh, Glasgow, Oxford, Cambridge and London. I 
identified focal mendicants by systematically searching city centre streets choosing those 
who were actively asking for money and who could be observed discreetly. Active 
solicitation met the requirement for a true interaction between players, while discretion 
avoided potential observer effects and met the ethical need to avoid causing subjects distress. 
At the start of each observation session, I recorded the sex and estimated age of the 
mendicant; whether or not they had a dog; the presence of a collection cup or hat, whether or 
not this already contained money; and environmental variables (temperature, wind, 




During each observation session, I scored each pedestrian who passed the focal mendicant as 
0 (did not donate) and 1 (donated). I also recorded the sex and estimated age of each 
pedestrian, whether they were alone or in a group (>1 person together); the sex ratio of any 
groups; and the presence of any children, prams or people in wheelchairs. 
Observations were made in two formats: (i) with a pen and paper and (ii) automated on an 
iPad. The initial pilot observations and the first observations in the final dataset were made 
using datasheets and a pen and paper. I optimised this process by changing to using an iPad 
and the Animal Behaviour Pro application to collect data (Newton-Fisher, 2012). The same 
underlying data were collected in both protocols.  
Observations were carried out on opportunistic basis for 3-4 weeks in each city location.  
2.2.2 Money Carrying Survey 
 
I carried out a post hoc survey to establish whether pedestrians carry loose change, In order 
to  verify my assumption that pedestrians are indeed playing a form of dictator game with 
mendicants. A research assistant and I stood on pavements within 100 metres of previous 
observation sessions (in Edinburgh only). We asked all pedestrians if they had time to stop 
for a one question survey. Those who did stop were asked whether they were carrying 
change, and if so, how much. We surveyed 366 respondents across 9 observation sessions of 
90 minutes each at 6 locations.  
2.2.3 Money Drop Experiment 
 
One of the key dissimilarities between the observational method outlined above and a 
conventional dictator game is that I did not give participants an endowment. I decided to 
carry out an experiment where I did give my street participants a small endowment. I did this 
by dropping small sums of money on the pavement “upstream” from a focal mendicant, 
outside either a coffee shop or bus shelter where a research assistant and I could stand 
without detection. We surreptitiously placed a 50 pence coin on the ground while pretending 
to tie up a shoelace. We observed the coin until it was picked up a pedestrian. We scored the 
finder as 1 (gave the coin to the focal mendicant) or 0 (kept the coin). As a control, we 
scored the behaviour of the next pedestrian walking in that direction. We also recorded 
whether the pedestrian who picked up the coin was walking toward or away from the 




2.2.4 Dictator Game Under Observation  
 
To examine the effect of an experimental observer, and to directly compare behaviour in a 
street with behaviour in a lab, I conducted a conventional dictator games in the street. I 
carried out a survey of participants’ attitudes to homelessness in which the first question was 
a dictator game. I carried out 96 surveys at 3 locations.  
Participants were offered a £5 endowment in the form on an Amazon voucher which would 
be emailed to them after the survey. They were then asked if they would like to split this 
endowment with the homelessness charity Shelter Scotland. Participants were able to keep 
the whole endowment or give any amount of it away in £1 increments. There were then 
several follow up questions on their attitudes towards homelessness and what their 
motivations for giving to mendicants would be (see Appendix 1). After the survey, the 
amazon vouchers were emailed out and appropriate donations made to Shelter Scotland.  
The surveys were carried out by a research assistant and I using a standardised script (see 
Appendix 2), with responses recorded on iPads using Quick Tap Survey software (‘Quicktap 
Survey Mobile Application v1’, no date). The first screen of the survey was an information 
page which participants had to confirm they had read before continuing with the survey. All 
pages of the survey carried the University of Edinburgh logo. Participants had to give their 
consent to taking part before continuing. All participants were given a sheet with a follow-up 
email address, which they could use to contact after the survey to ask any further questions 
or withdraw their permission. Any personal data were kept on a laptop that had been 
encrypted and all data were anonymised prior to any further analysis. All surveys were 
carried out in a pair with another research assistant. 
2.2.5 Analysis 
 
Observational and Laboratory analysis 
To compare the rate of giving in my street dictator game with the rate of giving in standard 
laboratory games I used the results generated by a relatively recent meta-study of dictator 
game giving (Engel, 2011, Figure 2.1). I calculated the number of giving events observed in 
this meta study (13297 out of a total 20813) and generated a contingency table, which also 
contained data from my observation of giving to mendicants. I then used a chi-squared test to 





Because all experiments in this study generated binary data, I made contingency tables for 
each experiment and then used chi-squared tests to establish if those classes were different to 
one another. 
2.2.6 Ethics statement 
 
All observational and experimental protocols were reviewed and approved by the School of 
Biological Sciences ethical review committee.  Discreet observation is acceptable when all 
observations and experiments take place in public locations where members of the public 
have a reasonable expectation of being observed and all data are anonymised. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Observed rates of donation 
 
451 out of 44993 pedestrians (1%) donated to focal mendicants. This is a dramatically lower 
proportion of giving than is recorded in lab games (where 63.89% choose to split their 
endowment; χ2= 34046, p< 2.2 x 10-16; Figure 2.2). I tested my field data against the standard 
laboratory result. This was the appropriate comparison as I was interested in comparing 
behaviour observed in the laboratory to behaviour observed in a naturalistic setting.  
























This difference in donation cannot be accounted for by low rates of change carrying alone: 
46.9% of people surveyed were carrying change (median amount carried =£2, range 0-
£12.50, Figure 2.3), 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Proportion of participants giving in lab dictator games and a street 
analogue (donation to mendicants) (± binomial error bars; Laboratory N = 20813, 
















2.3.2 Money Drop Experiment 
 
When I dropped money on the street and observed the behaviour of individuals that picked it 
up as they passed a mendicant, a higher proportion of individuals chose to donate their 
windfall (17.24%) than donated in the general observational dataset (~1%). The frequency of 
donation in the windfall treatment was also significantly higher than the frequency of 
donation in the explicit control (χ2= 6.4277, p=0.011; Figure 2.4). The experimental 
treatment data were tested against the experimental control data collected at the same time. 
This comparison was appropriate as there was an ecologically valid control that allowed 
inferences to be drawn about individuals’ behaviour when they had received a windfall.  
 
 




2.3.3 Dictator Game Under Observation 
 
When playing a dictator game on an iPad, while under observation by a researcher, 
significantly more people chose to split their £5 endowment with a Homeless Charity than to 
keep it all (χ2=93.521, p< 2.2 x 10-16; Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6).  The two classes being tested 
against each other here is the proportion of respondents choosing to split the endowment 
versus the proportion choosing to keep it all. This comparison is appropriate here as this 
experiment had no formal control in the study design and demonstrates the difference in 
behaviour between these two groups.  
 
Figure 2.5 Histogram showing the values of endowment given away by experimental subjects 
in a dictator game carried out on an Ipad. The dictator game made up part of a survey of 
experimental subjects stopped in the street. Value of endowment given away in £, Frequency 




Figure 2.6  iPad dictator game (±binomial error bars. N = 96) 
 
 
2.3.4 Comparison across contexts 
 
There are differences between all treatments with giving occurring at a rate of 1%, 85%, 





Figure 2.7 All experiment comparison plot (± binomial error bars. Mendicant N = 44993, 
iPad N = 96, Laboratory N = 13297, Money Drop N = 58) 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The first result in this chapter is the most striking (Figure 2.2). This result shows that there is 
a discrepancy between how people behaviour in the laboratory and the wild. Whilst there are 
certainly critiques that can be made of how strict the analogy between these two scenarios is, 
I address these in the follow up experiments in this chapter. This result shows that when 
people are invited to play a dictator game in the laboratory the majority of people will 
choose to split their endowment with an anonymous unrelated individual, yet when 
pedestrians are asked the same question by a mendicant in the street approximately 1% of 
people are willing to give away money.  
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There are several possible explanations for this result: (i) People have an intense awareness 
of their social scenario. Despite the anonymity that is a feature of the vast majority of 
laboratory games, subjects in these games cannot help but be aware of the fact that they are 
under observation. This result provides evidence that when there are similar pay-offs in 
different contexts people behave very differently and are sensitive to the fact that they are 
being observed. (ii) The existence of an experimental context has been shown to influence 
subjects’ behaviour in several studies (Liberman, Samuels and Ross, 2004). It may well be 
the case that by comparing an experimental context to an observational one this difference is 
exacerbated. (iii) In the laboratory individuals are playing with endowments that they have 
just received as a windfall. From a rational economic perspective we might expect them to 
view this windfall money as their own, as you would money that you had earned that was in 
your pocket walking down the street. However, it is clear that people tend not to view 
windfalls in this way leading to the possibility that individuals are much more generous in 
the laboratory context than they would be with their own money (Nash, Siegel-Jacobs and 
Stone, 1994). 
In my explanation of these results I have used the term pay-offs. In this context I do not 
mean purely the direct monetary benefits and costs that would be considered pay-offs in a 
economic setting. Instead I am considering the ultimate benefits and costs to an organisms 
fitness that an action can have. These benefits and costs could be quantified in the form of 
monetary value but they could also take other forms, like reputational benefits. My first 
result in this section indicates that when such pay-offs are held relatively constant but an 
individual’s social context is changed then their cooperative decision changes. In this 
instance people are playing anonymously with similar sums so their ultimate pay-off is likely 
to be similar.  
A further explanation for the low levels of giving seen in the street context is that people do 
not have change in their pockets. The rise in use of debit and credit cards to pay for goods 
and services may have led to a reduction of change carrying  (2016 UK Payment Markets, 
2016). I assayed this by carrying out a short study where I surveyed 366 individuals about 
whether they were carrying change and how much they were carrying (Figure 2.3). The 
result that around half of all individuals carry change leads me to believe that this is not a 
substantial barrier to giving. One study has shown that availability of change is important in 
dictator game giving (Fielding and Knowles, 2014). If I was to extrapolate from my first 
result and assume that giving would double if all individuals carried change, the proportion 
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of individuals giving would only increase to ~2%, which in comparison to the laboratory 
result of ~63% remains a substantial difference.  
Other explanations could include simply that people are simply distracted whilst walking 
along the street. In order for my study to be analogous to the laboratory dictator game I 
restricted my sample to mendicants’ who were actively begging. Despite this, pedestrians 
may just not have noticed or paid attention to the focal mendicants. This is interesting as the 
role of attention in naturalistic cooperative behaviour has not been widely studied. There has 
been some work on small groups of children in primary schools and how they pay attention 
to each other (Gillies, 2003). A further experiment has examined how individuals level of 
experience at completing a screen-based task changes where they direct their gaze 
(Velichkovsky, 1995). However, the level of attention participants give may substantially 
change their cooperative decisions.  
In laboratory dictator games individuals are given endowments to play with. I was interested 
in what would happen if small endowments were given in a street dictator game. People gave 
at a significantly higher level when they had picked up a small endowment (Figure 2.4). The 
most parsimonious explanation is that despite my critique of conventional economics, 
monetary pay-offs do matter. In this instance people have received a windfall of a small 
endowment and are much more willing to donate this money (Milkman and Beshears, 2009). 
This could be interpreted with the previous result as when pay-offs are held constant 
between contexts, context can have an impact on behaviour. However, when a pay-off is 
changed within a context, as in this experiment, the different size of pay-off can change 
behaviour. This is important as if laboratory results are to be generalised, cooperative 
behaviour will be very different depending on the source of their endowment. Furthermore, 
in real life scenarios, cooperative actions and pay-offs do not always take the form of money, 
they can also be goods, services or reputational benefits. Given this, thinking about what 
constitutes a windfall and how this might impact individuals’ further cooperative decision-
making could be an interesting direction for future research (Fielding and Knowles, 2014).  
I wanted to test the hypothesis that observability changes behaviour in a dictator game. I ran 
a laboratory style dictator game on iPads in the street, sampling from the same population 
that I used for my other street studies. I found that people gave in this context at an 
extremely high rate (Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6). There could be several reasons for this: (i) In 
comparison to a laboratory games all subjects were asked to fill out their choice on an iPad 
in front of the experimenter. Although the rubric gave a reassurance that all data were treated 
anonymously the subjects could not help but be aware that someone was standing 
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immediately in front of them and asking if they wanted to donate. This may have influenced 
their decision. (ii) In this study individuals were asked if they wanted to split the money with 
a charity as opposed to a particular individual. There is evidence that there are social 
injunctions against giving to mendicants (Phelan et al., 1997). It may be the case that people 
were simply more willing to give to a homelessness charity as instead of a mendicant. When 
this result is compared to the laboratory game it could also be the case that people were more 
willing to give to a charity, which may be seen as more deserving, than another anonymous 
subject (Reinstein and Riener, 2012).  
The distribution of giving in the iPad dictator game also differs from that seen in laboratory 
games (Figure 2.1, Figure 2.5). The key difference being that in the iPad game the majority 
of those that gave, donated their whole endowment rather than splitting it, although the 
subjects were given this option. There is evidence that under time pressure people tend to 
behave in a more cooperative way (Rand, Greene and Nowak, 2012). People might feel like 
they are under time pressure in this setting resulting in a higher level of donation. 
Alternatively, individuals may feel that the value of the windfall they are receiving is not 
worth the hassle of giving away their email address and subsequently reclaiming a voucher 
worth less than five pounds. 
Overall, this study shows that there are clear differences in how people go about making 
cooperative decisions when they are not in a laboratory. The follow-up experiments then go 
on to show unambiguously that both pay-offs to the individual and the level of scrutiny the 
individual believes themselves them to be under are important in cooperative decision-
making. Finally, there is some evidence that supports the idea that people will change their 
cooperative decision when under time pressure. These results are important as they provide 
evidence that context is important in cooperative decision-making and that the value of pay-
offs does change individuals’ decisions. More broadly this allows us to question the results 




































The high frequency of human cooperative behaviour between non-relatives poses a dilemma. 
This cooperation is relatively stable despite constant selection for cheating. There are several 
mechanisms which stabilise cooperation, chiefly reciprocity and punishment (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2002; Gintis and Fehr, 2012). In reciprocity, interactants provide sequential benefits 
to one another. Reputational information can stabilise these interactions as individuals can 
choose to interact selectively with those with good reputations whilst avoiding or punishing 
those with poor reputations (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Sylwester and Roberts, 2010). We 
would therefore expect individuals to adjust their social behaviour to maintain a good 
reputation (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). However, cooperative behaviour can also be costly. 
Evolutionary theory predicts individuals will act selfishly to minimise their costs, therefore 
we would expect individuals to optimise reputational benefits whilst minimising costs 
(Hamilton, 1964). 
As studies of dictator games generally occur in the laboratory it has not been possible to 
examine if such reputational benefits influence naturalistic cooperative behaviour, as 
laboratory studies normally require that participants’ decisions are anonymised. The 
analogue of giving to mendicants in the street allows these questions to be studied explicitly. 
We might expect individuals to behave more prosocially in the presence of others in order to 
maintain a cooperative reputation. A phenomenon known as an audience effect (Hamilton & 
Lind, 2016; Triplett, 1898). This could lead to a prediction that as, for example, donation 
visibility increases there will be an increase in donation rate (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; 
List, 2006; Jones and Linardi, 2012). However, some studies suggest that as a behaviour’s 
visibility increases, individuals adopt the local social norm, which could be cooperative or 
non-cooperative, this effect is stronger in women. Adopting a local norm may be a low risk 
reputational strategy.  (Jones and Linardi, 2012; Exley, 2016). This effect is mirrored in 
work which suggests that reputation effects tend to narrow the set of possible equilibrium 
distributions, suggesting that people tend to conform to a particular set of behaviours 
(Levine, 1996). Overall I predict that higher visibility will lead to more donations, so 
individuals will give more in larger groups and when there is a higher density of pedestrians. 
Reciprocity will also affect the relationship between donors and recipients. When a donor 
gives to a mendicant, there is not generally an expectation of an ongoing reciprocal 
relationship. However, donations to buskers can be regarded as payment for music. This 
leads me to expect that buskers will receive higher levels of donation than mendicants.  As 
there is no reciprocity present with charitable collectors I would also expect them to receive 
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less than buskers. However, as there is no social stigma associated with giving to charitable 
collectors, I predict that collectors will receive more than mendicants (Belcher and DeForge, 
2012). 
Social contagion, where observers adopt the behaviour of others;  (Kearns et al., 2009; 
Christakis and Fowler, 2010; Tsvetkova and Macy, 2014). can influence both prosocial (Van 
baaren et al., 2004; Shang and Croson, 2009) and antisocial behaviour (Faria, Krause and 
Krause, 2010). Broadcasting of prosocial behaviour tends to result in observers engaging in 
more prosocial behaviour (Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991; Fowler and Christakis, 2010; 
Lacetera, Macis and Mele, 2015). However,  it is unclear whether these effects are contagion 
or homophily, where similar people are more likely to be friends and behave similarly 
(Mcpherson, Smith-lovin and Cook, 2001; Leider et al., 2009). Moreover, Social contagion 
is not universal: Tsvetkova &Macy (2014) suggest that whilst receiving help may lead to 
recipients engaging in more helping behaviour, observing someone else helping may lead to 
observers being less generous. One online study suggested that individuals may falsely 
broadcast their prosocial behaviour, however even these false broadcasts went on to cause 
increases in others prosocial behaviour (Lacetera, Macis and Mele, 2015). The general result 
that individuals tend to copy social behaviour leads me to predict that pedestrians who 
observe donations would be more likely to donate themselves. 
Sex differences in charitable behaviour are well established (Einolf, 2011; Böhm and 
Regner, 2013). Women donate more than men, although there is debate about whether men 
give larger amounts when they do give, and the effect of marital status is unclear (Piper and 
Schnepf, 2008). Women are almost twice as likely to give to causes focussed on wellbeing 
such as, healthcare, homelessness and education charities (Marx, 2000). Men are more likely 
to give to charities involved in sport or civil rights (Einolf, 2011). There have been 
explanations for these results, with women reporting a greater sense of responsibility and 
empathy towards those less fortunate, whilst men are more likely to give when there is an 
opportunity for reputational gain (Böhm and Regner, 2013). Several studies have indicated 
that men and women’s giving changes when framed in different ways (Chowdhury, Jeon and 
Saha, 2017). One study indicated that a higher proportion of men give to mendicants than 
women. this study was substantially smaller than the present one (Goldberg, 1995). The 
majority of work suggests that women give at a higher rate than men and I would predict that 
to be the case in the present study. 
There is limited research addressing the factors influencing pedestrians giving on the street. 
What little research there is tends to focus on individuals’ perceptions of mendicants and 
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their companion animals (Lankenau, 1999; Kane, Green and Jacobs, 2010; Irvine, Kahl and 
Smith, 2012). One study suggested that the presence of panhandlers in a local area in the US 
didn’t change the public’s attitude to panhandlers (Lee and Farrell, 2003). In another study 
students said they would be more likely to give to a busker if they had also previously given 
to a mendicant, however, this study relied on self-reporting (Lemay and Bates, 2013). One 
study made a link between perception and behaviour by asking whether mendicants with 
humorous signs received more donations. The reverse was found to be true (Boster et al., 
2016). A sociological study examined interactions between mendicants and pedestrians and 
drew conclusions about their reciprocal nature (Llewellyn, 2011). This study is marred by a 
very small sample and an entirely descriptive approach. Overall, I have found a paucity of 
studies addressing the actual behaviour of individuals giving money to mendicants, buskers 
or charitable collectors on a scale comparable to mine. One large-scale study of more 
generalised helping behaviour in 36 US cities found that individuals’ helping behaviour has a 
negative correlation with population density. This study also highlighted the need for 
measures of the total number of pedestrians passing by as well as those helping, which it did 
not report (Levine et al., 1994).  
This study examines the social influences on donation behaviour in the street. I ask: (i) Does 
group composition affect giving – and in particular does group size or sex ratio affect 
donation? (ii) Do people experience social contagion in giving – and in particular does 
giving by others affect donation? (iii) Does recipient type affect donation – and in particular 
do people give more frequently to charitable collectors or buskers than mendicants? And (iv) 
Are there sex differences in giving behaviour? 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Observational Methods 
 
Between 16/06/2014 and 25/02/2015 I observed 66994 pedestrians walking past focal 
mendicants, 21301 pedestrians walking past buskers, and 10474 pedestrians walking past 
charity collectors in 5 cities. This gave a total of 98769 observations of pedestrians. See 
Chapter 2 for focal mendicant selection criteria and data collection protocol.  To select 
buskers and charity collectors, I systematically searched city centres and chose buskers who 
were performing and charitable collectors who were shaking tins. I combined these datasets, 
see Appendix 3 for data configuration script. This generated a data set consisting of 66761 
observations of groups walking past mendicants, pedestrians and buskers that could be sub-
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divided in specific ways to address my questions. Note that this dataset consisted of 66761 
groups of pedestrians as opposed to groups of pedestrians. 
3.2.2 Analysis 
 
3.2.2.1 Do group size and sex ratio affect donation? 
 
Using only data collected from mendicants, I constructed a binomial generalised linear 
mixed model (GLMM; 1=donation, 0 = no donation). I fitted group size as a factor (1 or >1); 
and group sex ratio (proportion of females in a group) as a continuous variable. I fitted 
Session, Location and Site as random terms. For additional variables investigated, see Table 
3.1. 
3.2.2.2 Does others’ donation behaviour affect current donation rate? 
 
Using a subset of the data on mendicants where the exact timing of each event had been 
recorded (see Appendix 3 for explanation), I constructed a binomial GLMM (1=donation, 
0=no donation), with donation during the preceding two minutes (0 = no donation, 1 = at 
least one donation) as the fixed effect of interest. To control for variation in the number of 
people in the street, I also fitted crowd density (number of pedestrians in previous two 
minutes) as a fixed effect. I fitted Session, Location and Site as random terms. For additional 
variables investigated, see Table 3.2.  
3.2.2.3 Does recipient type affect donation?  
 
Using the full data set, I constructed a binomial GLMM (1=donation, 0 = no donation), with 
recipient type (mendicant, busker, charitable collector) as the fixed effects of interest, and 
Session, Location and Site as random terms (see Table 3.3 for additional terms tested).  
3.2.2.4 Does sex affect donation? 
 
Using only data collected on solitary pedestrians, and where the exact timing of each event 
was known, I constructed a binomial GLMM (1=donation, 0 = no donation), with pedestrian 
sex as the fixed effect of interest.  I fitted Session, Location and Site as random terms. (see 
Table 3.4 for additional terms tested).   
I also examined the interaction of sex of donor with sex of recipient (see Table 3.5) 
All analyses were carried out in the lme4 package of R version 3.3.1, RStudio 1.0.136.  
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3.2.3 Coffee Buying Experiment 
 
To further investigate the effect of previous donation on current behaviour (‘social 
contagion’), we manipulated the social environment by conducting 63 experimental coffee 
donations to mendicants in Edinburgh city centre, between 01/10/2015 and 30/11/2015.  
Once a focal mendicant had been identified, a research assistant and I recorded pedestrian 
behaviour for 10 minutes, using the standard protocol. After 10 minutes, I approached the 
focal and asked if I could buy them a hot drink. If they said yes, I bought the drink, gave it to 
them, and re-joined my assistant. The assistant recorded the time of asking and giving of a 
hot drink. We then recorded pedestrian behaviour for 10 minutes after the hot drink 
donation. 
I compared the proportion of pedestrians donating in either the 5 or 10 minutes before and 
after the experimental donation, using Wilcoxon-signed rank paired tests. 
3.2.4 Ethics statement 
 
All observational and experimental protocols were reviewed and approved by the School of 
Biological Sciences ethical review committee.  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Do group size and sex ratio affect donation?  
 
Pedestrians in groups were less likely to give than solitary pedestrians   (Table 3.1, Figure 









Table 3.1 GLMM examining whether group size and sex ratio affect the probability that an 
individual pedestrian donates to a mendicant (n=66994 pedestrians from 88 observation 
sessions in 40 locations on 48 days) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 0.014 (0.011, 0.019) -28.465 < 2.0 x10-16 
Group Size (1 or >1) 0.518 (0.415, 0.641) -6.105 1.03x10-9 
Sex Ratio 0.835 (0.683, 1.021) -1.793 0.0729 
Money 0.904 (0.652, 1.258) -0.620 0.5351 
Rain: Light 1.223 (0.726, 2.038) 0.785 0.4324 
Rain: Heavy 1.077 (0.308, 3.324) 0.126 0.8998 
Random Effect Variance Standard Deviation  
Session 0.1649 0.4061  
Date 0.1470 0.3824  




Figure 3.1 The effect of group size on probability of donating to a mendicant (model 
estimates ± 95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
3.3.2 Does others’ donation behaviour affect current donation rate? 
 
Donation by another person during the preceding two minutes had no effect on likelihood of 
donation (Figure 3.2, Table 3.2). However, the probability of donation declined as pedestrian 
density increased (Figure 3.2, Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2 GLMM examining whether donation by others affects the probability that an 
individual pedestrian donates to a mendicant (n=65926 pedestrians from 111 observation 
sessions in 52 locations on 36 days). 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 0.060 (0.031, 0.113) -8.871 2 x 10-16 
Group Size 0.393 (0.284, 0.534) -5.927 3.08 x 10-9 
Sex Ratio 0.883 (0.671, 1.162) -0.904 0.3661 
Rain: Light 1.257 (0.686, 2.293) 0.762 0.4459 
Rain: Heavy 0.310 (0.346, 5.727) 0.407 0.6837 
Crowd Density 0.986 (0.972, 1.000) -2.079 0.0376 
Prior Donation 1.200 (0.942, 1.495) 1.548 0.1216 
Random Effect Variance Standard Deviation  
Session 0.127843 0.35755  
Date 0.136225 0.36909  





Figure 3.2: The effect of crowd density (people per 2 min) on probability of donating to a 












3.3.3 Does recipient type affect donation?  
 
Mendicants received the fewest donations, followed by buskers, then charitable collectors 
(Table 3.3, Figure 3.3 The effect of recipient type on probability of donating to a mendicant 
(model estimates ±95% Confidence Intervals).). 
Table 3.3 GLMM examining whether recipient type affects the probability that an individual 
pedestrian donates (n=98769 pedestrians from 141 observation sessions in 65 locations on 
54 days) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 0.034 (0.025, 0.044) -24.883 2 x 10-16 
Group Size 0.489 (0.427, 0.558) -10.751 2 x 10-16 
Sex Ratio 1.098 (0.971, 1.243) 1.514 0.130 
Rain: Light 1.204 (0.863, 1.678) 1.123 0.261 
Rain: Heavy 1.324 (0.391, 3.866) 0.500 0.617 
Type: Charity 1.139 (0.724, 1.784) 0.579 0.563 
Type: Mendicant 0.370 (0.270, 0.509) -6.288 3.22 x 10-10 
Random Effect Variance Standard Deviation  
Session 0.17915 0.4233  
Date 0.04575 0.2139  




Figure 3.3 The effect of recipient type on probability of donating to a mendicant (model 












3.3.4 Does sex affect donation? 
 
Sex appeared to affect probability of donation, with men giving at 82% the rate of women 
(Table 3.4, Figure 3.4), with no interaction between pedestrian sex and recipient type (z = -
1.59, p = 0.11).   
Table 3.4 GLMM examining whether the sex of solitary pedestrians affects the probability of 
donating to all recipient types (n=26489 pedestrians from 111 observation sessions in 52 
locations on 36 days) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
Intercept 0.052 (0.033, 0.083) -12.669 < 2 x 10-16 
Pedestrian Sex: 
Male 
0.820 (0.709, 0.947) -2.737 0.0062 
Focal Sex: Male 1.000 (0.689, 1.445) -0.002 0.9981 
Type: Charity 1.184 (0.761, 1.826) 0.773 0.4394 
Type: Mendicant 0.438 (0.313, 0.616) -4.898 9.67 x 10-7 
Rain: Light 0.998 (0.693, 1.430) -0.011 0.9909 
Rain: Heavy 1.389 (0.336, 5.731) 0.474 0.6352 
Crowd Density 0.978 (0.961, 0.995) -2.562 0.0104 
Random Effects Variance Standard Deviation  
Session 0.09551 0.3090  
Location 0.13557 0.3682  






Figure 3.4 The effect of pedestrian sex donating to all types of recipient (model estimates 
±95% Confidence Intervals). 
To further investigate the sex effect and ensure that it was not an artefact driven by 
idiosyncrasies or uneven sample sizes within the data for the different recipient types, I re-
analysed the data from each recipient type separately. There was a strong effect of pedestrian 
sex when giving to charitable collectors, with men giving at 69.9% the rate of women 
(GLMM, odds ratio = 0.699 (95% CI=0.538- 0.902), z=-2.74, p=0.0062). However, there 
was no sex difference when giving to buskers (GLMM, odds ratio = 0.830 (95%CI=0.658- 
1.044), z=-0.60, p=0.11) or to mendicants (GLMM, odds ratio = 0.958 (95%CI=0.736- 
1.248), z=-0.32, p=0.75).  See Appendix 4 for full model outputs. 
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Table 3.5 GLMM examining whether the sex of solitary pedestrians affects the probability of 
donating to all recipient types, including an interaction of pedestrian sex and recipient sex 
(n=26489 pedestrians from 111 observation sessions in 52 locations on 36 days) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio (95% CI) z Statistic P(z) 
Intercept 0.0454 (0.027, 0.074) -12.398 < 2 x 10-16 
Pedestrian Sex: 
Male 
1.119 (0.771, 1.627) 0.603 0.5464 
Focal Sex: Male 1.192 (0.782, 1.826) 0.828 0.4078 
Type: Charity 1.185 (0.761, 1.826) 0.779 0.4360 
Type: Mendicant 0.438 (0.313, 0.616) -4.905 9.32 x 10-7 
Rain: Light 0.997 (0.693, Inf) -0.016 0.9871 
Rain: Heavy 1.399 (0.338, 5.393) 0.486 0.6271 
Crowd Density 0.978 (0.962, 0.995)  -2.565 0.0103 
Pedestrian Sex: 
Male * Focal Sex: 
Male 
0.693 (0.462, 1.038) -1.812 0.0700 
Random Effects Variance Standard 
Deviation 
 
Session 0.09635 0.3104  
Location 0.13460 0.3669  
Date 0.05594 0.2365  
 
 
3.3.5 Coffee buying experiment 
 
Experimental donation to a focal mendicant had no effect on donation by pedestrians, 
regardless of whether the comparison period was either five minutes (Wilcoxon, V63 = 191, p 
= 0.27) or ten minutes (Wilcoxon, V63 = 578.5, p = 0.74) before and after an experimental 







Figure 3.5 The proportion of pedestrians donating five minutes before and after an 




Figure 3.6 The proportion of pedestrians donating 10 minutes before and after an 
experimental donation to a focal mendicant. N=63 
 
3.4 Discussion 
My first two hypotheses relate to the effect of group size and density of pedestrians in the 
street. I predicted, based on the literature and evolutionary theory that people would give 
more when their donations were more visible. So individuals in larger groups and in crowds 
would be expected to give at a higher rate. My results do not support these hypotheses. 
Firstly, people give more when they are on their own (Figure 3.1, Table 3.1). This result is a 
replication of a much smaller previous study (Goldberg, 1995). There could be multiple 
reasons for this. For the group size result, although evidence suggests that people are more 
likely to produce prosocial signals when under observation (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; 
Nettle, Nott and Bateson, 2012), there are also studies suggesting that under observation 
people were more likely to obey whatever they believe to be the social norm (Jones and 
Linardi, 2012). As I have shown in chapter 1, giving in this context is a rare event, meaning 
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that in the majority of groups giving does not occur, which means there is a consistent social 
norm of “don’t give”. Giving to mendicants can be a socially sensitive issue and people in 
groups might be sensitive to the varied opinions of other group members and how giving 
might impact their reputation (Haley & Fessler, 2005; List, 2006).  To establish if group size 
has an effect independently of a “don’t give” social norm I would need to run an analysis 
comparing the donation rate in groups where an individual has chosen to give and where no-
one has. Unfortunately, given the low rate of donation, my available data on co-giving is 
very scant and answers provided by running this analysis would be meaningless. A much 
more simple explanation could be that individuals on their own were simply less distracted 
and were more likely to notice the mendicant. 
The density result, which shows that people are less likely to give when there are more 
people around (Figure 3.2, Table 3.2), is consistent with several experimental results 
showing that in larger groups it is harder to maintain cooperation in public goods dilemmas 
(Capraro and Barcelo, 2015; Duffy and Xie, 2016). I have been considering the interaction 
between a focal and a pedestrian as being the theoretical equivalent of a dictator game. 
However, when the interactions of everyone on a piece of pavement at the same time are 
considered it could be thought of as public goods game. The individual donor paying a cost 
with a “benefit” of assuaging the guilt of all pedestrians. Other explanations could include 
that when there are a larger number of people present there is diffusion of responsibility, as 
in the bystander effect (Darley and Latane, 1968). Alternatively, the social norm effect as 
described above could also apply here, a larger number of people choosing not to give 
indicating that there is a norm of “don’t give” leading to lower levels of giving (Jones and 
Linardi, 2012).  
My next hypothesis addresses how the type of focal I observed influences pedestrians’ rate 
of donation. I hypothesised that when there was a higher level of reciprocity in the 
interaction that there would be a higher rate of donation. This hypothesis was borne out in 
the case of buskers who did indeed receive a higher level of donation than mendicants 
(Figure 3.3, Table 3.3). Although other explanations could include that pedestrians may have 
noticed buskers more than mendicants due to fact that they are busking. Charitable 
collectors, however, received more than either mendicants or buskers (Figure 3.3, Table 3.3). 
There could be several possible explanations for this. It could be the case that mendicants 
and buskers are both private individuals whilst charities are publicly recognised institutions 
that are required to abide by legal frameworks. Therefore, when donors give money to a 
charitable collector they may feel that this donation is a more trusted way of “doing good” 
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than giving to a private individual. If a pedestrian’s main motivation for giving is not 
reciprocal but to enhance their reputation or to make themselves “feel good” as a proximate 
mechanism, then there are also fewer social injunctions against giving to charitable 
collectors than to either mendicants or buskers (Phelan et al., 1997). 
Social contagion did not influence giving behaviour in this study, contrary to my hypothesis 
(Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6). In the temporal model (Table 3.2), whilst the density of pedestrians 
did influence donation behaviour, the number of donations that occurred in the two minutes 
prior to donation did not have a significant effect on current donation behaviour. This 
suggests individuals are not copying behaviour that they have just seen. Similarly, I also 
carried out an experiment to test this effect where I made experimental donations to focal 
mendicants. In this experiment, there were no differences seen in the rate of donation 
observed before and after experimental donations. There are several possible explanations 
for this. Social contagion has been most consistently observed in systems where individuals 
already know one another socially (Fowler and Christakis, 2010). Where social contagion 
has been documented in naturalistic systems with strangers this has tended to be in contexts 
like road crossing where the focal behaviour takes place simultaneously (Faria, Krause and 
Krause, 2010). Overall, this study did not support social contagion as a mechanism for 
explaining donation behaviour on the street. 
I found that women did tend to give more frequently than men (Figure 3.4, Table 3.4). 
However, this result was complex and I found that the context in which individuals gave 
influenced their behaviour. Men giving significantly less often to charitable collectors drove 
this overall result, with no significant differences between the sexes for mendicants and 
buskers (Figure 3.4, Table 3.4). There could be several explanations for this. It has been 
discussed in the charitable giving literature that men and women give to charity for subtly 
different reasons and that they give to different charities, with women being far more likely 
to give to human charities that deal with homelessness and healthcare than men (Dufwenberg 
and Muren, 2006; Einolf, 2011; Chowdhury, Jeon and Saha, 2017). As discussed earlier in 
this chapter donation towards buskers might not be considered as a charitable donation 
before which might explain the lack of a significant difference between men and womens’ 
behaviour in this instance (Table 3.4).  What is harder to explain is the lack of difference in 
giving to mendicants. It has been suggested that women tend to give to charities as they feel 
a sense of responsibility whilst men are more likely to give when they feel they can gain 
reputational benefits (Willer, Wimer and Owens, 2015). This analysis was concerned only 
with singletons and spur of the moment decisions and it could be the case that neither 
57 
 
feelings of responsibility or reputational concerns were driving pedestrians decision-making 
in this instance, which may explain the lack of difference in this result. Earlier parts of this 
chapter also indicate that pedestrians did not increase their donation behaviour in the 
presence of larger group, suggesting that individuals may not be using this behaviour as a 
form of reputational prosocial signalling. Furthermore when I used a similar model to 
address the interaction between the sex of the donor and the sex of the recipient (Table 3.5), 
the interaction was not significant. However, it did approach significance suggesting that 
males may give qualitatively less to men than women. In order to establish this effect clearly 
further experiments would be required. 
Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that individuals walking along a street are influenced 
by social factors when they are making decisions about how to cooperate with individuals 
asking for money. Group size and density both play an important role. Individuals on their 
own are more likely to give, as well as individuals experiencing a lower level of foot traffic. 
Pedestrians do not seem to be affected by social-contagion when making decisions about 
cooperating in the street. The type of individual asking them for money is important, with 
charitable collectors the most likely to receive donations followed by buskers and 
mendicants, suggesting that the reciprocal nature of relationships may play a role in 
decision-making. Finally, the sex of the donor is important with women being more likely to 
give to charitable collectors than men, however, this result is not consistent across 










































A major challenge in understanding the evolution of stable cooperation between non-
relatives is in identifying the mechanisms that maintain public goods (Boyd & Richerson, 
2009; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Public goods problems develop wherever the benefits of a 
social action accrue to all members of a group, while any costs are borne by individual actors 
(Hardin, 1968). They are vulnerable to invasion because cheats can take advantage of other 
individuals leading to the breakdown of cooperation (El Mouden, West and Gardner, 2010). 
Public goods are a common feature of social systems, from microbes to primates (Kahneman 
and Knetsch, 1992; Heilmann, Krishna and Kerr, 2015). These problems are ubiquitous in 
human society and underlie a significant proportion of the problems that society faces, 
ranging from international cooperation to reduce carbon emissions through to regulation of 
employment and financial services (Milinski et al., 2006). For example, no one country will 
undertake to invest heavily in carbon capture technology unless there are assurances that 
others will provide a market for that technology. Understanding how cooperation is 
maintained in these situations and how dilemmas can be resolved is therefore of potentially 
global importance. 
Public goods problems can be resolved by deploying mechanisms that reduce the payoffs of 
cheating, such that cheating no longer pays (‘conditional cooperation’, including punishment 
and forms of reciprocity (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). 
They can also be resolved by reducing the extent to which resources are publicly accessible, 
which in humans is often achieved through private ownership (Ostrom, 2003). Private 
ownership of resource can stabilise public goods dilemmas as owners who have a future 
interest in a particular resource have a greater incentive to invest in its maintenance (Hardin, 
1968). 
Experimental investigations of human public goods games have tended to confirm 
theoretical expectations, finding that cooperation declines over time except where 
participants receive some type of reputational information, or are able to punish selfish 
behaviour (Fu et al., 2008; Gächter, Renner and Sefton, 2008). However, Most of this work 
has been carried out on experimental subjects in a laboratory (Levitt and List, 2007; Benz 
and Meier, 2008). Laboratory studies of cooperative behaviour have several key flaws: (i) 
people have an intense awareness of the fact that they are under observation; (ii) there is an 
experimental demand effect; (iii) there are no negative pay-offs in the laboratory and; (iv) 
there is a participant sampling bias (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Benz and Meier, 2008; 
Barmettler, Fehr and Zehnder, 2012; Burton-Chellew and West, 2013). Given these 
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problems with laboratory games and the limited research on naturally occurring public 
goods, we require a wild system that will allow us to make more generalizable conclusions 
about human cooperative behaviour and the importance of different mechanisms in resolving 
these games (Yoeli et al., 2013). 
The ideal context for investigating the causes of variation in contributions to a naturally 
occurring PG is one which: (i) occurs in public space; (ii) is frequent; (iii) has clear costs to 
individual cooperators; (iv) has clear benefits to society as a whole; (v) occurs across a range 
of socio-demographic conditions; (vi) is easy to observe without detection; and (vii) is easy 
to manipulate without detection or ethical concerns. Despite the frequency of public goods 
games in human interactions, very few meet these criteria. In this study I frame the 
abandonment and retrieval of dog faeces in public parks as a public goods game, and use the 
rate of faecal abandonment as a measure of cooperative behaviour.  In this framing, the cost 
of picking up dog faeces, in terms of time, disgust and risk to health (real or perceived) 
accrues to the individual, while the benefit of having a clean park accrues to all park users 
(Hardin, 1968; Kolodko, Read and Taj, 2016). This system allows me to manipulate the level 
of canine faeces in parks and so test whether people are monitoring and responding to others 
behaviour.  
Although dog fouling may seem a trivial problem, it frequently ranks among the top 10 
issues of citizens concern; it imposes substantial costs on municipal authorities (Keep Britain 
Tidy, 2014); and limits the appeal and accessibility of urban green spaces. Despite this, there 
has been limited formal investigation. A recent systematic review identified that there were 
no robust studies of interventions to combat dog fouling (Atenstaedt and Jones, 2011). The 
limited evidence available suggests that fouling is most likely to be committed by males, 
those with a lower income and those walking their dogs off the leash (Wells, 2006). These 
results  are consistent with those from the, better developed, litter dropping literature, 
suggesting that younger individuals, those from lower socio-economic backgrounds and 
males tend to drop more litter (Krauss, Freedman and Whitcup, 1978; Durdan, Reeder and 
Hecht, 1985). Ease of disposal also makes a difference, with higher availability of bins 
leading to less littering (Finnie, 1973).   
There are marked differences in the level of dog fouling in different places, ranging from 
53.5% of dog walkers picking up faeces in parks Northern Ireland in 2006 to only 5% on 
Chicago sidewalks in 1980 (Jason, McCoy, Blanco, & Zolik, 1980; Wells, 2006). This 
suggests that local norms for abandoning or picking up faeces may apply. Whilst their rigour 
is in question, there have been several studies of interventions that appear to reduce fouling. 
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For example, in Chicago, community members were taught to pick up dog faeces using 
plastic bags and pooper scoopers, which in combination with a widely publicised legal 
ordinance for dog-walkers to carry pooper-scoopers, resulted in a sustained reduction in dog 
fouling two years after the intervention (Jason & Zolik, 1980). In the litter-dropping 
literature, community based approaches have also been found to be effective in causing 
sustained change (Wall et al., 2009; Kolodko, Read and Taj, 2016). A more recent study by 
Keep Britain Tidy, although not peer reviewed, found that signs carrying images of eyes 
were effective at reducing dog fouling, indicating that individuals are sensitive to cues 
indicating that they are under observation (Keep Britain Tidy, 2014).  
People can decide whether they will cooperate conditionally on the basis of information 
about others contributions (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001; Kocher et al., 2008). The 
broken window theory suggests that people are more likely to behave in a non-cooperative 
way in places that are poorly maintained (Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008). The original 
theory suggested that there would be higher levels of crime in areas with more broken 
windows, graffiti and abandoned cars (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). Empirical support for this 
is mixed (Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008). In general, at sites which have a higher level of 
disorder people are less likely to behave prosocially, for example, one-shot naturalistic 
experiments of littering behaviour tend to show that people are more likely to litter at sites 
that are already littered (Reiter and Samuel, 1980; Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990; Ramos 
and Torgler, 2012). One longer term study, which considers ‘not littering’ as a private 
contribution to a public good, found that when the level of cleaning by the local authority is 
reduced there is an increase in littering (Dur and Vollaard, 2014). This suggests that 
individuals are sensitive to investments made by others and will adjust their behaviour 
conditionally. If an individual perceives that someone else is investing less, their pay-off for 
cooperating is reduced leading to a lower level of cooperation. There are also studies which 
suggest that the broken window theory only holds for particular types of anti-social 
behaviour, like robbery (Harcourt, 1998; Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). I manipulated 
the perceived level of dog fouling in public parks to ask the question: Will people change 
their behaviour as a result in a change in their perception of others contribution? I would 
predict that in areas with higher levels of dog fouling there will be increased additional 
fouling.  
People are sensitive to social context when making decisions about whether or not to 
cooperate in social dilemmas and often react to information about how observable their 
behaviour is when making decisions (Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; Yoeli et al., 2013). In 
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laboratory games, introducing reputational concerns, for example, allowing individuals to be 
identified across several games, can induce higher levels of cooperation. Theoretically 
people can seek to maximise their pay-offs by maintaining a cooperative reputation and so 
behave more cooperatively when they feel their behaviour is under scrutiny (Yoeli et al., 
2013). Similarly, in naturalistic field studies gentle proxies of observation can induce higher 
levels of cooperation (Milinski, Semmann and Krambeck, 2002; Rosenbloom, 2009; 
Wiessner, 2009). For example, numerous studies have demonstrated the effect of posters 
with eyes on them in inducing prosocial behaviour (Haley and Fessler, 2005). Such posters 
have been used to induce higher levels of donation in honesty boxes in academic tea rooms, 
deter bike thieves and discourage people from littering (Bateson, Nettle and Roberts, 2006; 
Nettle, Nott and Bateson, 2012; Keep Britain Tidy, 2014). In Chapters 2 and 4 I also 
demonstrated that people are sensitive to the number of other pedestrians when making 
cooperative decisions. Therefore, I expect that the risk of being observed will affect dog 
fouling, with less fouling where parks more overlooked.  
In my study I was interested in the way in which affluence affects willingness to invest in 
public goods as socio-demographic factors frequently affect decision making in cooperative 
scenarios (Lamba and Mace, 2011). Whilst this has not been consistently demonstrated in the 
laboratory, most studies show that affluent areas display more cooperative behaviour whilst 
less affluent areas are less cooperative (Gächter, Herrmann, & Thöni, 2004; Holland et al., 
2012; Wilson et al., 2009). For example, in a study where stamped addressed letters were 
dropped in the street in different parts of Dublin, the only variable that predicted rate of 
return was how affluent the area was (Silva and Mace, 2014). This finding does not hold 
universally, with some studies showing the reverse. For example, people in higher value cars 
were less likely to stop  at pedestrian crossings in California (Piff et al., 2012). Not 
dissimilarly, some reports suggest that individuals with higher incomes are less likely to pay 
attention to others on the street (Dietze and Knowles, 2016). Overall, the majority of studies 
show that socio-demographic effects play a strong role with more affluent areas producing 
higher levels of cooperation and I expected to replicate this result and see lower levels of dog 
fouling in affluent areas. 
A frequently cited method for resolving social dilemmas is private ownership of resources 
(Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 2003). For example, in the fishing industry, long term quotas, where 
fishermen have an investment in the future of their fishing grounds, have been shown to be 
effective in encouraging individual fishermen to limit their discards so that stocks have an 
opportunity to recover (Grafton, 1996; Branch, Rutherford and Hilborn, 2006). Similarly, in 
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laboratory games, where ownership of resources  is not possible, cooperation in public goods 
games tends to disintegrate rapidly (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). People also tend to behave 
more cooperatively towards individuals who they have an expectation that they will meet 
again, for example in areas with higher levels of house ownership (Bó, 2005). This effect, 
known as the “shadow of the future”, has been found in other species with similar reciprocal 
cooperative dynamics, such as cleaner fish (Oates, Manica and Bshary, 2010). In this study I 
expected that in areas with higher levels of home ownership fouling would happen at a lower 
rate.  
Here I investigate whether social variables affect dog fouling rates in public parks: 
Specifically, I ask whether fouling is affected by: (i) the risk of being observed cheating; (ii) 
affluence; (iii) property ownership (independently of affluence); and (iv) measures 
commonly thought to correlate with civic-mindedness and contribution to public goods. I 
then conduct a large scale manipulation experiment to ask whether fouling rates are 
influenced by an apparent shift in the local norm. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Park Selection 
 
To capture representative variability in socio-demographic factors, I used data from the 
Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics website to select 32 parks from the 147 parks listed on the 
City of Edinburgh Council website (Government, 2015). I ranked parks by percentage house 
ownership in the surrounding postcode in 2011, and, because the data were not positively or 




Figure 4.2 Park Locations 
4.2.2 Pilot data and optimisation 
 
Between 7th July 2015 and 7th August 2015, I conducted a pilot study to: (i) determine 
whether parks were appropriate for inclusion; (ii) identify the appropriate sampling method; 
(iii) identify a survey area in each park; (iv) estimate how many parks I could reliably visit 
and survey per day; (v) assess whether it was possible to measure the accumulation rate of 
new faeces, and (vi) optimise sampling frequency. I surveyed each park weekly, recording 
the location and total number of faecal deposits in each park. 
Parks were discarded if they: (i) were being developed for housing; (ii) were inaccessible 
(due to fences or building work); (iii) were smaller than the standard survey area. When I 
rejected a park I randomly selected another park from the same quartile, until eight 
appropriate parks in each quartile had been identified.  
I chose quadrat sampling over transect sampling because faecal deposits were usually widely 
distributed, at relatively low densities. I chose 50x50m squares as the standard sampling plot, 
being large enough to capture variation in dog faeces between parks but small enough to be 
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feasibly surveyed weekly. I surveyed each quadrat by walking the length of the quadrat at 
five metre intervals and recording the number of faecal deposits in each 5x5 m square. 
Within each park, I located the base of the quadrat on a main path leading to the park gate, 
and placed them such that they consisted of ≥80% open lawn, were reasonably flat and 
contained no major topographical features.  All quadrats were measured using a measuring 
tape and mapped using a standardised grid (Figure 4.3). The corners and 10m intervals were 
marked out using brown spray paint on the ground to ensure consistency of sampling 
between weeks. Salient features were mapped (such as trees, flower beds, benches, 
basketball nets). In two very narrow parks, a 100 x 25m quadrat was used instead of the 
standard 50 x 50 m quadrat. The GPS co-ordinates of the corners of the quadrats were 
recorded. 
This pilot revealed that summer fieldwork was inappropriate because rapid grass growth 











4.2.3 Determining Park Usage 
 
 In order to plan sampling frequency during experiments, I used a pilot study to determine 
the consistency of park usage. I undertook two types of observation in each of a selection of 
pilot parks. Firstly, I carried out an all-day observation in eight of the parks (Leith Links, 
Morningside Park, Calton Hill, Allison Park, Newcraighall Park, Bingham Park, Mortonhall 
Community Park and Clermiston Park), from 06:00 to 21:00. I recorded the number of park 
users, dog walkers and dogs per hour. Secondly, I carried out hour-long observations in six 
parks (Newcraighall Park, Abercorn Park, Leith Links, East Pilton Park, Davidson’s Mains 
Park and Murieston Park) every day at the same times (10:30 – 11:30, 11:50 – 12:50, 13:15 – 
14:15, 14:45 – 15:45. 15:55 – 16:55, and 17:10 – 18:10). I calculated intra-class correlation 
using the psych package in R on both hour by hour and day by day data.  
This analysis determined that surveying each park for one hour, once a week provided an 
accurate estimate of park usage (Table 4.1, Table 4.2). 
4.2.4 Intra-Class Correlations 
 
Table 4.1 Intra-Class Correlations by Day 
Measure Park Users Dog Walkers Dogs Total People 
Subjects 6 5 5 5 
Raters 5 5 5 5 
ICC Agreement 0.8228507 0.680289 0.792522 0.8231484 
 
Table 4.2 Intra-Class Correlations by Hour 
Measure Park Users Dog Walkers Dogs Total People 
Subjects 8 8 8 8 
Raters 15 15 15 15 




4.2.5 Do human social variables affect dog fouling rates? 
 
To investigate whether variation in dog fouling correlates with human variables, I carried out 
weekly observations for four weeks 01/02/2016 to 26/02/2016. Each week, I recorded the 
total number and location of all faeces in the experimental quadrats. From week 3 I recorded 
the number of new faecal deposits since the previous week, and the number of old faecal 
deposits that remained and had not disintegrated or been removed. My research assistant also 
conducted an hour long usage survey each week, recording the number of human park users, 
number of dog walkers, number of dogs. To correct for park size, we measured park area in 
m2 using the Ordnance Survey ‘digimaps’ online service.  
To test whether the risk of being observed affected fouling rates, we calculated 
‘overlookedness’ for each park, measured as the number of windows visible from the centre 
of the quadrat. To test the effect of  affluence, we obtained mean 2013 house price for the 
adjacent post code from Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics (Government, 2015) To test the 
effect of property ownership, we obtained percentage house ownership in the adjacent post 
code from Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics 2011 (Government, 2015).  
To analyse the social variables that had an explicit a priori prediction (those listed above), I 
constructed a series of generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs) with a negative binomial 
error structure, total number of faeces recorded per survey as the response variable, and Park 
as a random term (data had an over-dispersed Poisson structure). I tested each variable in 
turn by fitting it as a single fixed effect. 
In addition to the explanatory variables tested above in isolation, I examined the literature to 
generate a list of additional variables that might influence fouling rates. These were: 
(i) The effect of the possible presence of small children (which may either correlate 
with greater vigilance by bystanders or heightened feelings of responsibility). 
Measured as distance to nearest primary school using google maps. 
(ii) Two variables commonly assumed to indicate greater civic-mindedness: the 
percentage of left leaning voters at the ward level, and percentage voter turnout at 
the ward level. These were obtained for the 2017 Scottish Local Elections (Scottish 
Parliament, 2017).  
(iii) To rule out possible effects of direct enforcement, the distance to nearest Police 
station, using google maps.    
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I then constructed a multivariate negative binomial GLMM with total faeces counted per 
week as the response variable. I constructed a maximal model containing both the variables 
with explicit predictions and all the additional social variables as fixed effects. To select the 
candidate fixed effects, I first determined whether any of these measures were correlated by 
building a correlation matrix (Table 4.8). I then conducted a principal component analysis 
(PCA) to identify any potential composite axes (such as “park use” or “socio-
demographics”) for use as predictors in the GLMM.  
The correlation matrix revealed a strong correlation between number of dog walkers and 
number of dogs (Table 4.8), so I used number of dogs alone in all subsequent models. The 
PCA did not detect any components that explained significant variation (Proportion of 
Variance explained by Component 1 = 0.282), so no composite axes were used in subsequent 
models. To account for overdispersion, I used an observational level random effect with a 
Poisson distribution, and compared the output with a standard negative binomial model 
(which generated qualitatively similar results).  
To generate a minimal model, I performed a reverse stepwise deletion based on p-values and 
used likelihood ratio testing to establish that each model was not significantly different to the 
previous iteration of the model. I used this methodology rather than AIC values as the results 
were qualitatively similar, all steps resulted in lower AIC values. Some statisticians would 
also argue that performing a stepwise regression with p values is essentially the same as 
performing one with AIC, as they are in many ways restatements of the same thing (Harrell, 
2001). Both methodologies are also subject to similar methodological pitfalls as they involve 
testing repeated measures.  
All analyses were carried out in the lme4 package of R version 3.3.1, RStudio 1.0.136. 
4.2.6 Are fouling rates sensitive to an apparent shift in the local norm? 
 
From week 5, parks were randomly assigned to one of three treatments which were 
distributed evenly across the quartiles: removal (n=11), addition (n=11) or control (n=10) 
(Table 4.3, Appendix 5). In each park I created a treatment area, around the path that ran 
along the base of each quadrat, (see Figure 4.4 for an example). The treatment areas were all 
5 x 50m areas, except in the two parks with rectangular quadrats, where they were 2.5 x 
100m areas. 
In the removal treatment, I removed all dog faeces from the treatment area using a trowel 
and faeces disposal bags. The treatment was repeated each week for the remainder of the 
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experimental period. In the addition treatment, the number of dog faeces was doubled from 
the mean baseline number recorded in the treatment area during weeks 1-4. Doubling was 
repeated for two weeks, and then maintained at the week 6 treated level for the remainder of 
the experimental period “addition” was achieved using artificial dog faeces (see below). In 
the control treatment no changes were made. During weeks 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 I recorded the 
number of new faeces abandoned in the quadrat.  
To analyse the experiment, I constructed a negative binomial GLMM, with new real faeces 
accumulated per week as the response variable, and Park as a random term. I fitted treatment 
(Control, Addition, Removal), week since start of treatment, and treatment*week as fixed 
effects. To account for overdispersion, I initially used an observational level random effect 
with a Poisson distribution. However, I dropped this after likelihood ratio comparisons of the 
final model with and without this term revealed no significant difference.  
Table 4.3 Treatment schematic 
 
Treatment Type Before Treatment During Treatment 
Control (10 parks) Baseline faeces monitoring Baseline faeces monitoring. 
Addition (11 parks) Baseline faeces monitoring Amount of faeces doubled 
from mean baseline level in 
treatment area. 





Figure 4.4 Example map showing treatment area and observations of faecal deposits. Black 
crosses represent new faecal deposits. A red cross circled in black represents an old deposit 
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that is still present. A black cross with the word “add” next to it shows where an 
experimental fake faecal deposit was added. The red line represents the boundary of the 
treatment area surrounding the path. 
4.2.7 Making Artificial Dog Faeces 
 
Commercially available plastic dog faeces were costly, unconvincing, could be construed as 
litter and may be toxic if eaten by dogs. Therefore I manufactured 200 artificial, hand-made 
faeces using a mix of porridge oats and watered down PVA glue (see Figure 4.4). Aliquots 
of the oat glue mix were rolled into sausages of varying thicknesses, which were then formed 
into faecal shapes and sprayed with ‘mushroom’ coloured paint. These models had a 
heterogeneous texture and I could easily vary the size of faeces to reflect natural variation in 
size and shape. Porridge oats and PVA are not toxic to dogs. During model development, I 
trialled a number of prototypes, and used a group of 20 peers to test realism (see Appendix 6 









4.2.8 Ethics Statement 
 
All observational and experimental protocols were reviewed and approved by the School of 








4.3.1 Are dog fouling rates the product of number of dogs visiting a park? 
There was no relationship between the number of dogs and the number of faecal deposits, 
see Appendix 7 for means and standard errors (Table 4.4, Figure 4.5). 
Table 4.4 GLMM of the relationship between number of dogs visiting a park and fouling 
rates (n=128 observations from 32 parks over 4 weeks) 
Fixed Effect Event ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 6.972 (4.470, 10.675) 9.020 <2x10-16 
Dogs 0.995 (0.972, 1.019) -0.422 0.673 
Random Effect Variance Standard 
Deviation 
 
Park 1.29 1.136  
 
 
Figure 4.5 The relationship between number of dogs visiting a park and the number of 





4.3.2 Do human social variables affect dog fouling rates? 
 
4.3.2.1 Does the risk of being observed affect fouling rates? 
 
There was no relationship between overlookedness and number of faecal deposits (Table 4.5, 
Figure 4.6). 
Table 4.5 GLMM of the relationship between overlookedness and fouling rates (n=128 
observations from 32 parks over 4 weeks) 
Fixed Effect Event ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 6.851 (4.498, 
10.370) 
9.402 <2x10-16 
Overlookedness 1.391 (0.921, 2.11) 1.609 0.108 
Random Effect Variance Standard 
Deviation 
 






Figure 4.6 The relationship between overlookedness (number of windows visible from centre 
of experimental quadrat) and number of faeces (data are means per Park)  
We further investigated the risk of being observed by examining whether the number of non-
dog walkers using a park affected fouling rates, finding no effect (GLMM, event ratio 1.005 
(95% CI -0.01-0.022, z=0.71, p=0.48). Moreover, there was no evidence of social policing 
among dog walkers themselves, with no effect of number of dog walkers on fouling rates 
(GLMM, event ratio 0.995 (95% CI 0.97-1.02, z=-0.37, p=0.71).  
 
4.3.2.2 Does affluence affect fouling rates? 
 
There was no relationship between average 2013 house price in the adjacent post code and 




Table 4.2  GLMM of the relationship between average 2013 house price in the adjacent post 
code and fouling rate (n=128 observations from 32 parks over 4 weeks) 
Fixed Effect Event ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 6.896 (4.476, 10.409) 9.302 <2x10-16 
Scaled House Price 0.748 (0.489, 1.135) -1.401 0.161 
Random Effect Variance Standard 
Deviation 
 




Figure 4.7 The relationship between average 2013 house price in the adjacent post code and 






4.3.2.3 Does property ownership affect fouling rates? 
 
There was no relationship between percentage house ownership in the adjacent post code and 
fouling rates (Table 4.7, Figure 4.8). 
 
Table 4.7  GLMM of the relationship between percentage house ownership in the adjacent 
post code and fouling rate (n=128 observations from 32 parks over 4 weeks) 
Fixed Effect Event ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 11.640 (3.133, 
42.582) 
3.829 0.000129 
% House Ownership 0.991 (0.972, 1.011) -0.861 0.389290 
Random Effect Variance Standard 
Deviation 
 






Figure 4.8 The relationship between percentage house ownership in the adjacent post code 
and number of faeces (data are means per Park). 
4.3.3 Multivariate Analysis: do any social variables act together? 
 
The maximal model detected no significant effect of any of the social variables on dog 
fouling rates (Table 4.9). After model reduction, distance to nearest primary school remained 
as the sole significant term (Table 4.10). Parks that were closer to a primary schools had 


































Table 4.9 Maximal GLMM investigating the social variables affecting rates of dog fouling in 
public parks (n=128 observations from 32 parks over 4 weeks)  
Fixed Effect Event ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 6.713 (4.687, 9.616) 10.387 < 2 x 10-16 
Park Users 1.056 (0.915, 1.218) 0.745 0.456 
Dogs 0.960 (0.855, 1.078) -0.690 0.490 
% Left leaning voters 1.132 (0.683, 1.874) 0.482 0.630 
% Turn out 1.166 (0.575, 2.361) 0.425 0.671 
Park Size 0.842 (0.501, 1.414) -0.650 0.515 
Distance to Police 
Station 
0.967 (0.428, 2.188) -0.080 0.937 
Distance to Primary 
School 
0.688 (0.431, 1.100) -1.560 0.119 
House Price 2013 0.926 (0.528, 1.624) -0.267 0.789 
% Houses Owned 
2011 
0.916 (0.498, 1.684) -0.283 0.777 
Overlookedness 0.924 (0.444, 1.921) -0.212 0.832 
Number of people in 
area 
1.302 (0.737, 2.299) 0.910 0.363 
Hectarage 1.137 (0.605, 2.137) 0.399 0.690 
Density 1.196 (0.640, 2.234) 0.560 0.575 





0.02763 0.1662  








Table 4.10 Minimal GLMM investigating the social variables affecting rates of dog fouling 
in public parks (n=128 observations from 32 parks over 4 weeks) 
Fixed Effect Event ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 6.712 (4.508, 9.806) 9.965 < 2 x 1016 
Distance to Primary 
School 
0.628 (0.421, 0.925) -2.404 0.0162 





0.02925 0.171  
Park 1.08788 1.043  
 
Figure 4.9 The relationship between distance to nearest primary school and total number of dog 
faeces (model predictions ±95% CI)   
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4.3.4 Are fouling rates sensitive to an apparent shift in the local norm? 
Neither experimental addition nor removal of faeces had any detectable effect on the rate at 
which new faeces accumulated (Table 4.11, Fig 4.10), though there was a decline in 
accumulation rate over time (Table 4.11).  
 
Table 4.11 GLMM examining the effect of Treatment and time on the accumulation rate of 
new faeces in public parks   (n=160 observations, from 32 parks (11 Addition, 11 Removal, 
10 Control), over 5 weeks). 
Fixed Effect Event ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 3.745 (1.477, 8.942) 2.983 0.00285 
Faeces Treatment 0.820 (0.273, 2.447) -0.376 0.70729 
Removal Treatment 1.196 (0.412, 3.600) 0.341 0.73297 
Week Number 0.904 (0.848, 0.963) -3.162 0.00157 
Random Effect Variance Standard 
Deviation 
 
Park 1.295 1.138  
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Figure 4.10 The effect of experimental manipulation on accumulation rate of new faeces 
(Control = 10 parks, Addition = parks, Removal = 11 parks, over 5 weeks) 
4.4 Discussion 
My main experimental result suggests that my treatments do not have an effect on park user 
and dog walker behaviour (Figure 4.10, Table 4.11). There could be several explanations for 
this. The first being the pragmatic one that perhaps the treatment was not strong enough for 
park users to notice the difference in faeces accumulation in the different experimental 
treatments. Baseline faeces accumulation was variable between parks meaning that my 
treatment of doubling the level of faeces or removing all faeces may have had substantially 
different effects in different parks. Although this was an explicit part of the experimental 
design to ensure that the treatments were sensitive to local norms, follow-up work could add 
a high level of faeces to parks uniformly, regardless of the baseline level and test the 
response to this. 
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A further explanation for the lack of an experimental result could be that this behaviour is 
highly norm based. The high level of variation between parks, where some parks have a high 
level of faeces and others have much less could be indicative of habitual behaviour. So the 
same individuals may have been using the park throughout the experimental period and did 
not change their behaviour in response to this treatment. It may take a substantially more 
explicit treatment, such as eye signs, a community intervention or stronger policing of anti-
social behaviour or reward of prosocial behaviour to induce behaviour change (Jason et al., 
1980; Keep Britain Tidy, 2014).  
A further possibility could be that the two treatments may have worked in opposing ways. 
There is evidence that when common spaces are routinely cleaned individuals may free-ride 
on that regular cleaning to avoid doing it themselves (Dur and Vollaard, 2014). It may be 
that in the removal treatment individuals free-ride and do not pick up their dogs faeces. In 
the addition treatment, although I hypothesized that a higher level of faeces would lead to a 
higher level of abandonment of faeces by dog-walkers, as in the Broken Window Theory, 
dog faeces provokes a high level of disgust and it may be the case that this prompted more 
prosocial faeces-picking behaviour in these parks (Davey, 1994).  
There is a significant effect of week number with the level of dog faeces declining across 
parks across the experimental period. There could be several explanations for this. The first 
being phenological, in that the experimental period ran from late February until the end of 
March. The temperatures were cold throughout this period and there was still snow on the 
ground in March which makes the loss of more faeces through washing away unlikely 
(Munro-Faure, personal observation). There was also an additional 2 hours and 29 minutes 
of daylight at the end of the experimental period in comparison to the beginning (Met Office, 
2017). This additional daylight may have reduced the problem of normally prosocial dog 
walkers being unable to find their pets’ faeces in the dark, leading to a reduction in faeces 
abandonment across the experimental period. Other explanations could include general 
stochastic variation in behaviour. 
There is a final possibility that my survey method was insufficiently sensitive to pick up 
changes in level of dog faeces abandonment. I tested this possibility by running an analysis 
where I established that I could detect the treatments I put in place. I could detect this 
change. This in combination with the fact that I detect clear differences between parks 
suggests that my surveying method is sufficiently sensitive.  
In terms of my observational work none of the factors I identified prior to data collection 
correlated with the level of dog faeces in public parks. There are several possible 
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explanations for this. The fact that the level of dog faeces found does not correlate with the 
number of dogs being walked in the parks is suggestive of the fact that there is some type of 
social game being played (Figure 4.5, Table 4.4). Or, if not a social game, other extrinsic 
factors may be influencing people’s decision-making behind abandoning faeces.  In terms of 
socio-demography there is a high level of variation in both percentage house ownership and 
mean house price and it is fascinating that I have failed to replicate the patterns seen in other 
studies (Figure 4.7, Figure 4.7, Table 4.6, Table 4.7). Scotland has historically had a high 
level of social welfare provision in comparison to the sites of other dog fouling studies I 
have referred to (Jason et al., 1980; Mclean, Gallager, & Lodge, 2013; Wells, 2006). It could 
be the case that residents from a variety of socio-demographic backgrounds in Edinburgh 
have a fairly consistent view of how much they are willing to privately invest in a public 
goods game. It would be interesting to carry out further cross-cultural work to establish if 
this pattern holds in other locations. 
In terms of overlookedness, it could be the case that people simply do not use windows as a 
cue of being observed (Figure 4.6, Table 4.5). There may be an evolutionary basis for this, 
some work suggests that we have an innate predisposition to be sensitive to human faces and 
that windows simply do not prime us to make social decisions (Dupierrix et al., 2014; 
Wilkinson et al., 2014). In chapter 4 I show that people are sensitive to the number of other 
pedestrians but not cars when making social decisions and it could be the case that this 
finding is indirectly being replicated here. Dog-walkers may actually need other people to be 
present in order to be primed to make a social decision as opposed to a rational one. There 
may be a confounding factor that in highly overlooked parks the population density is higher 
leading directly to a higher level of dog fouling. However, studies which investigate how 
population density impacts the length and frequency of dog walks do not support this. Dogs 
in more densely populated areas tend to get a higher frequency of shorter walks whilst dogs 
in lower density areas tend to get fewer longer walks, with the total amount of time dogs 
spend on walks being similar between areas with different population densities (Degeling, 
Burton and McCormack, 2012). 
In terms of number of other park users, including dog walkers, the methodology I selected of 
using mean level of faeces in combination with mean park usage may not have been 
sufficiently sensitive to pick up an interaction between likelihood of being seen and dog 
fouling behaviour. None of the parks had a constant stream of usage throughout the 
observation sessions. It could be the case that even if there is a relationship between 
likelihood of being seen and dog fouling that even in parks with a high level of usage that 
87 
 
there is a sufficiently high level of incidence of dog walkers being on their own in the park to 
not detect this relationship. Further work might involve extensive observation of parks from 
a discreet location to establish if actual faeces-picking behaviour varies with how many other 
individuals can see/be seen by a focal dog-walker. 
Finally, there is a possibility that this could be a statistical artefact. I used a stratified random 
sampling approach to select my parks. This approach assumes that my response variable will 
be normally distributed, which it proved not to be. It could be the case that the high level of 
variation in faeces I see between parks, with some parks having consistently almost no 
faeces and other parks having high but variable levels of faeces, could mean that I was 
unfortunate in that my random approach selected “weird”, non-representative parks. 
Given that none of my hypothesised explanatory variables correlated with the observed level 
of dog faeces in public parks I then decided to generate additional hypotheses to try and 
identify what other variables could explain these patterns in the hope of identifying 
hypotheses for future research. I initially tested these additional variables for correlation with 
one another and the pre-existing explanatory variables and discarded only one (Table 4.8). 
When I used a reverse stepwise deletion to remove all non-significant variables from a 
maximal model only one variable become significant: distance from a primary school 
(Figure 4.9, Table 4.9, Table 4.10). Parks that were closer to primary schools had more 
faeces than parks that were further away. There is a relatively simple explanation for this, 
which is one of convenience and minimal time and effort cost to the dog-walker. Dog-
owning families may tend to walk their dogs at the same time as dropping off their children 
for primary school resulting in parks near primary schools receiving a higher level of faecal 
deposit than parks elsewhere.  
I would like to highlight that this explanation is highly speculative and would require 
substantially more investigation to confirm. The finding that people are motivated by 
convenience, however, does correspond with some results from the litter-dropping literature 
(Finnie, 1973; Kolodko, Read and Taj, 2016). It would be interesting to carry out further 
work on how the availability of bins correlates with faeces abandonment, and perhaps carry 
out further manipulations where bins and perhaps stands containing faeces bags are added or 
removed from parks and the effect that this has on faeces abandonment. The hypothesis that 
people are more likely to carry out prosocial behaviour when it is convenient would also fit 
well within a public-goods framework as making something more convenient limits the cost 
of prosocial behaviour to the individual dog-walker. 
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Overall this study found that patterns in faeces abandonment in public parks are difficult to 
explain. The fact there is no correlation between the number of dogs using a park and the 
level of faeces suggests that there is some type of social game being played. However, what 
variables influence this game are not clear. There are tentative suggestions that convenience 
and limiting the cost of prosocial behaviour may be of importance to dog-walkers. Finally, it 
seems that dog-walkers are not sensitive to the higher or lower levels of disorder that I 
introduced in my experimental treatments when they are making decisions about whether or 


























Chapter 5 - Jumping the lights: Do people use social cues to make decisions about 






















In the previous chapter I examined how the usage and overlookedness of a public space 
influences decision-making in a naturally occurring public goods game and if individuals are 
sensitive to evidence that others have cheated. Here, I will ask how the density of observers 
influences individuals’ decision-making in public goods games in real time and how 
individuals’ decisions change when they observe others cooperating or cheating instead of 
just the evidence of cooperation or cheating.  
Human cooperative behaviour between anonymous non-relatives presents a problem. This 
cooperation is relatively stable despite constant selection for cheating. The public goods 
game is a structure of pay-offs which underlies much human cooperative behaviour. 
Individuals invest in a resource at an individual level whilst benefits accrue to all members 
of a group, providing an incentive to cheat. These games have largely been studied using 
volunteers in laboratory models (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Levitt and List, 2007). 
Cooperation usually declines over time in iterated public goods games (Fehr & Gächter, 
2002; Levitt, & List, 2007). There are several mechanisms which resolve these dilemmas, 
including policing, punishment and reputational effects. These mechanisms prevent 
cooperation from disintegrating by changing the pay offs available to participants. A free-
riding individual may receive a lower net pay-off if co-operators can identify and punish 
free-riders. Similarly reputational effects can mean that free-riders may miss out on the 
benefits of cooperative interactions in the future, if they do not keep up their side of the 
bargain (Boone and Buck, 2003; Gintis and Fehr, 2012).  
Our current understanding of the generalizability of laboratory results is weak (Levitt et al., 
2007). For example, whilst there is debate about the role of cultural variation in laboratory 
experiments, there is a recruitment bias towards western undergraduates (Lamba and Mace, 
2011). Laboratory games necessarily use simplified payoff structures, and assume that 
people’s decisions reflect or even predict their decisions in natural conditions with similar 
payoff structures. However, these laboratory games assume that participants perceive losses 
from experimental endowments in the same way as they perceive real life costs. It is 
ethically unacceptable for participants to leave a laboratory study worse off than they arrived 
(British Psychological Society, 2014). However, real life cooperative decisions carry 
implications, positive and negative, which people can account for in their decision-making 
(Maxwell N Burton-Chellew and West, 2012; Winking and Mizer, 2013). People also tend to 
change their behaviour when they are aware that they are being observed (Haley and Fessler, 
2005).  Related to this is the experimental demand effect, where the behaviour of 
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experimental participants  is influenced by their perception of what researchers expect them 
to do (Barmettler, Fehr and Zehnder, 2012). This effect makes the implications of laboratory 
results unclear in a naturalistic setting. 
Critiquing laboratory experiments by studying analogous natural systems is important if we 
want to understand the drivers of human cooperative behaviour (Winking and Mizer, 
2013).The pay-off structure of public goods dilemmas is common in human society. Global, 
examples include financial markets and fishing quotas, however, there are also local 
examples that people experience daily. In order to understand what is driving cooperative 
behaviour and critically evaluate standard laboratory results we need to identify public good 
games that can be easily observed, quantified and manipulated. For example, cyclists on at 
pedestrian crossings. Cyclists stopping at red lights experience a small time cost and the 
energetic expense of regaining speed (Kautz and Neptune, 2002). All other road users benefit 
from cyclists following the rules as the roads are safer, but the benefit to the individual 
cyclist is minimal, creating an incentive for cyclists to jump lights. 
There are laws clearly stating what behaviour is illegal , yet the probability of detection and 
sanctioning is low (Rehfisch, 2012, Appendix 8). Therefore, cyclists are engaged in a public 
goods game with clearly stated rules, but imperfect policing. A study carried out in Norway 
showing that both cyclists and motorists’ behaviour aligned more closely with the game 
theoretic solution than traffic rules provides further evidence for this (Bjørnskau, 2015). 
Other studies of red light infringements by cyclists have not framed the interaction as a 
public goods game, and have focussed on intersections as opposed to pedestrian crossings, 
however, they have detected several trends: (i) Light jumpers are more likely to be young 
and male (Rosenbloom, 2009; Wu, Yao and Zhang, 2012; Johnson et al., 2013). (ii) Cyclists 
are less likely to jump when there are pedestrians waiting at a crossing (Rosenbloom, 2009). 
(iii) Cyclists are more likely to jump if there is already another cyclist jumping (Johnson et 
al., 2011). (iv) Jumping is less likely if cyclists knew they could be fined (Johnson et al., 
2013). (iv) Cyclists are more likely to jump if they were not wearing a helmet (this conflicts 
with work which suggests that helmet-wearers take more risks) (Pai and Jou, 2014; Gamble 
and Walker, 2016). In the absence of reliably imposed sanctions, it is likely that mechanisms 
like reputation effects and social contagion may mediate this behaviour.   
Cooperative behaviour can be influenced by reputational effects. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, people can alter their cooperative behaviour when under observation. For example, 
the  bystander effect is a well-documented phenomenon where individuals’ behaviour will 
change depending on a particular threshold  number of observers (Darley and Latane, 1968).  
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Similarly, in Chapter 3 of this thesis, I demonstrated a density effect where pedestrians were 
less likely to donate to mendicants when they were in a denser crowd. Even a gentle proxy of 
observation can cause changes in cooperative behaviour. The “seeing-eye” effect describes 
where a poster with eyes on it can prompt people to behave more cooperatively (Bateson, 
Nettle and Roberts, 2006). People make these changes as they care about their reputations, 
having a poor cooperative reputation may result in few opportunities to engage in reciprocal 
interactions in the future, leading to a lower net pay-off. In this study I will ask whether 
cyclists change their light jumping behaviour in response to how many people can see them. 
I predict that when behaviour is more observable fewer cyclists will jump the lights.  
There is evidence that social contagion, where individuals copy behaviour from others, can 
play a role in cooperative behaviour (Kearns et al., 2009; Christakis and Fowler, 2010; 
Tsvetkova and Macy, 2014). There are many studies suggesting that social contagion can 
influence behaviour, both prosocial (Van baaren et al., 2004; Shang and Croson, 2009) and 
antisocial (Faria, Krause and Krause, 2010). Broadcasting of prosocial behaviour tends to 
result in observers engaging in more prosocial behaviour (Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991; 
Fowler and Christakis, 2010; Lacetera, Macis and Mele, 2015). However, social contagion 
doesn’t always hold, with one study suggesting that whilst receiving help may lead to the 
recipient engaging in more helping behaviour, observing someone else helping may lead to 
the observer engaging in less generous behaviour (Tsvetkova and Macy, 2014). In general, 
studies demonstrating real life person to person effects of social contagion are rare. In this 
study I asked if cyclists change their light jumping behaviour in response to the action of 
other cyclists. I predict that cyclists will copy both jumping and stopping behaviour. 
Otherwise, research on cyclists has tended to focus on cyclist safety and accident risk. The 
major hypothesis in this field is “Safety in Numbers” which suggests that both pedestrians 
and cyclists are safer when there are more of them.  (Hamilton, 1971; Jacobsen, 2015). 
Whilst there is good empirical support for this hypothesis, there is very little work to identify 
the proximate mechanisms that mediate it. Theoretical modelling based approaches have 
suggested that theoretically drivers avoid cyclists more when there are more of them 
(Thompson, Savino and Stevenson, 2016). Game theory has also been used to model road 
user interactions (Elvik, 2014).  
In contrast to Chapter 4, here I directly investigate actions as they occur, rather than indirect 
evidence of previous actions. Moreover, I examine people’s immediate reactions to the 
behaviour of others as it happens. In particular, I ask whether red-light jumping by cyclists at 
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pedestrian crossings is influenced by the the presence and number of observers, and the 
behaviour of other cyclists. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Site selection  
 
Pilot observations between 09/08/2016 and 30/08/2016 identified 10 appropriate light-
controlled pedestrian crossings within the City of Edinburgh (Figure 5.1, Appendix 9). I 
chose pedestrian crossings because there is no risk from crossing car traffic, so the physical 
risk associated with cheating is low. I ruled out crossings with faulty lights or prohibitively 
low traffic volume, so that all sites experienced a minimum of 2 cyclists per hour (mean 
13.08 ±1.19 SE). At each site I identified an observational zone around the pedestrian 
crossing, extending 10m in either direction from the control light, and incorporating the road 
and pavement (Figure 5.2). 
 











5.2.2 Data collection: measuring red light jumping  
 
For both the pilot data (13 observation sessions at 8 sites) and the main investigation (44 
observation sessions at 10 sites), I coded the behaviour of focal cyclists for analysis in a 
binomial model (1 = jump, 0 = wait). A ‘focal’ cyclist was designated as the first cyclist to 
arrive after a pedestrian had pressed the crossing button and the light had turned red. This 
means that total n for each 90 minute observation session was the number of button pushes 
when there was at least one cyclist present at the crossing. 
Figure 5.2: Diagram of observational zone around street lights 
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As potential explanatory social variables, I recorded: (i) the number of pedestrians in the 
zone around the crossing (Figure 5.2), including those crossing the road; (ii) the number of 
pedestrians actually crossing the road; (iii) the number of vehicles in the zone around the 
crossing (Figure 5.2); (iv) the total number of cyclists accumulating at the crossing during 
that red light phase; and (v) the number of those cyclists that jumped the red light. I also 
recorded environmental variables: (i) time; (ii) rain (none, light, heavy); and (iii) wind (none, 
light, strong).   
5.2.3 Pilot study: Simulation and Power Analysis  
 
In order to estimate appropriate sample sizes for the main investigation, I conducted a power 
analysis using the pilot data (13 observation sessions at 8 sites).  
I constructed a binomial generalised linear mixed model (GLMM), with behaviour of the 
focal cyclist (1=jump, 0=wait), as the response variable. Number of pedestrians and number 
of vehicles were fitted as fixed effects. Observation site and session were fitted as random 





I used the effect sizes generated by this model to simulate new response variables. For the 
fixed terms I generated dummy data by sampling randomly from the pilot data. For the 
random effects I sampled from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation taken 
from the initial model. I used Equation 5.2 to generate response terms on the log odds scale. 
I then carried out an inverse logit operation to convert these to probabilities and sampled 





y = intercept + slope(pedestrians).people + slope(vehicles).cars + 
Rsite + Rsess 
Equation 5.2 Generating simulated response variables based on 
dummy data 
Jump ~ pedestrians + vehicles + (1|site) + (1|session) 
Equation 5.1 Model for predicting cyclists jumping 




I ran the original model on the simulated data, saving the output coefficients and p values. I 
iterated this process 10,000 times for four different numbers of “sessions” and four different 
numbers of “observations per session”. For each combination of sessions and number of 
observations per session I calculated the power for both observations on both pedestrians and 
vehicles by dividing the number of significant results by the total number of runs (Table 5.1, 
Table 5.2). 
This analysis indicated that ≥700 observations, partitioned into number of sessions and 
number of observations per session, would be sufficient to detect real effects. Therefore I 
planned my main investigation to include at least 800 observations (final total = 863 



















Table 5.1 Simulation results for Pedestrians 
Number of sessions: 50 70 90 100 
Number of observations 
/session: 
 
5 0.3559 0.5170 0.6499 0.7038 
10 0.7086 0.8590 0.9360 0.9601 
15 0.8923 0.9863 0.9930 0.9959 
 
Table 5.2 Simulation results for Vehicles 
Number of sessions: 50 70 90 100 
Number of observations 
/session: 
5 0.4859 0.6132 0.7301 0.7731 
10 0.7743 0.8948 0.9529 0.9700 
15 0.9162 0.9761 0.9959 0.9973 
 
5.2.4 Main investigation 
 
Between 01/09/2016 and 14/10/2016 we conducted 44 observations of 90 minutes at 10 
sites, during  morning (08:00-09:30)  and afternoon (16:30-18:00) rush hours, with a 





5.2.4.1 The effect of observers on red light jumping 
 
I analysed the full data set using a binomial GLMM with behaviour of the focal cyclist as the 
response variable (1=jump, 0=wait), and site, session and observer as random effects. I fitted 
number of pedestrians and number of vehicles as the fixed effects of interest, conducting a 
partial f test of each term by dropping it from the model and comparing the reduced model to 
the full model. 
 
5.2.4.2 The effect of other cyclists’ behaviour on red light jumping 
 
I restricted the data to instances where at least two cyclists were present (216 observations 
across 39 sessions at 10 sites) and constructed a binomial GLMM. Here, I used the behaviour 
of the focal cyclist a fixed effect (i.e. as a treatment factor, with two levels Jump or Wait), 
and analysed the behaviour of all other cyclists as the response variable (1=at least one other 
cyclist jumped, 0 = all other cyclists waited). I fitted number of cyclists, number of 
pedestrians and number of vehicles as additional fixed effects. Site, session and observer 
were fitted as random effects. I conducted partial f test on each term by dropping it from the 
model and comparing the reduced model to the full model. 
 
5.2.5 Experimental Methods 
 
I experimentally tested the effect of one cyclist’s behaviour on others using a stooge cyclist 
who stopped at red lights in front of another cyclist. I ran 49 successful trials. 
A major challenge with this experiment was ensuring that the stooge reached the light at the 
right time, made more difficult because lights varied in the latency between button push and 
turning red (Figure 5.3). To address this, I recorded how long it took each light to change. 
For each set of light, I took the modal changing time and measured how far the stooge cyclist 
could cycle in the modal time. The stooge cyclist then positioned themselves this distance 
from the traffic lights. 
When the stooge saw another cyclist approaching, they began to cycle, and a research 
assistant pushed the button at the light. The stooge then stopped at the light, such that the 
approaching cyclist reached the crossing immediately after the stooge. 
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The research assistant then recorded the standard variables, before crossing themselves. 
Coordinating these elements was difficult: approaching cyclists could travel faster than the 
stooge; light changing time was unpredictable, and pedestrians pressed the button at 
inconvenient moments.  
 
Figure 5.3 Example of time to light changing at the Rankeillor Street site 
 
To analyse the experiment, I set the experimental data as Treatment and compared it against 
the observational data as Control, analysed the data with a binomial GLMM.  For the 
Treatment data, I used the behaviour of the cyclist arriving behind the stooge as the response 
variable (1 = Jump, 0= Wait). For the Control data, I used the behaviour of the original focal 
cyclist as the response variable (1 = Jump, 0= Wait).  Treatment (Control or Treatment), 
number of pedestrians and number of vehicles were fitted as fixed effects, and session, site 
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and observer as random effects. I tested if treatment had a significant effect by dropping it 
and carrying out a partial f test with the reduced model. 
Note that the obvious reciprocal of this experiment (a stooge cyclist deliberately jumping the 
light in front of another) was impossible since it entailed actively breaking the law.  
5.2.6 Analysis 
 
All analyses were carried out in the lme4 package of R version 3.3.1, RStudio 1.0.136. 
5.2.7 Ethics Statement 
 
All observational and experimental protocols were reviewed and approved by the School of 
Biological Sciences ethical review committee.  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 The effect of observers on red light jumping 
 
The probability of a focal cyclist jumping the lights decreased as the number of pedestrians 
increased (Figure 5.4, Table 5.3). When there were no pedestrians present, more than 29% of 
cyclists jump the lights.  






Table 5.3 GLMM investigating variables affecting the probability that a focal cyclist jumps a 
red light (n=863 from 44 observation sessions at 10 sites) 
Fixed Effects Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 0.544 (0.325, 0.901) - 2.377 0.0175 
Pedestrians 0.960 (0.924, 0.996) - 2.143 0.0321 
Vehicles 0.940 (0.812, 1.089) - 0.826 0.4089 
Random Effects Variance   
Session 0   
Site 1.75 x 10 (-1)   
Observer 5.65 x 10 (-10)   
Figure 5.4 The effect of number of pedestrians at a crossing on the probability that a focal cyclist 
jumps a red light. The model predictions for this plot used data which marginalised sources of error 






5.3.2 The effect of other cyclists’ behaviour on red light jumping 
 
When the focal cyclist jumped the lights, the following cyclists were more likely to jump the 
lights (Figure 5.4, Table 5.4), with at least one other cyclist jumping 24% of the time. When 
the focal cyclist stopped, at least one other cyclist only jumped 6% of the time. The total 
number of cyclists had no effect (Table 5.4). 
 
Figure 5.5 The effect of the behaviour of a focal cyclist on the probability that at least one 





Table 5.4 GLMM investigating the effect of the behaviour of a focal cyclist on the probability 
that at least one other cyclist jumps a red light (n jump = 58, n stop = 216) 
Fixed Effects Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 0.234 (0.025, 2.183) -1.296 0.1950 
Treatment 3.215 (1.321, 7.982) 2.597 0.0094 
Pedestrians 0.986 (0.889, 1.083) -0.279 0.7800 
Vehicles 0.830 (0.551, 1.250) -0.909 0.3631 
Total Cyclists 0.859 (0.359, 1.718) -0.391 0.6959 
Random Effects Variance   
Session 0.0148   
Site 0.2545   
Observer 0   
 
5.3.3 Stopping Experiment 
 
Stopping by a stooge had no detectable effect on the probability of a focal cyclist jumping a 




Figure 5.6 The effect of stopping by a stooge on the probability that a focal cyclist jumps a 








Table 5.5 GLMM investigating the effect of stopping by a stooge on the probability that a 
focal cyclist jumps a red light (n control = 772, n stop =49) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
(Intercept) 0.555 (0.335, 0.908) -2.362 0.0182 
Treatment 0.664 (0.291, 1.376) -1.046 0.2958 
Pedestrians 0.963 (0.928, 0.998) -2.017 0.0437 
Vehicles 0.921 (0.801, 1.060) -1.147 0.2514 
Random Effect Variance   
Session 0   
Site 1.625 x 10-1  
Observer 1.583 x10-1  
 
5.4 Discussion 
In this chapter I made two central predictions: (i) That cyclists would jump red lights less 
when their behaviour was more observable and; (ii) That cyclists will copy others jumping 
and stopping behaviour. The first of these predictions is well supported, for each additional 
pedestrian the proportion of cyclists jumping declines by 4% (Figure 5.4, Table 5.3). There 
are several possible explanations for this. Although the experimental situation is anonymous, 
cyclists may still care about their external image score. This may not be a rational 
behavioural adjustment but it may be the case that this behaviour is not actively harmful and 
that individuals who behave in this way gain more advantage from other reciprocal 
interactions elsewhere in their lives (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). In order to study this 
effectively it would be necessary to acquire data regarding the cooperative behaviour of 
individuals in this study in other settings. 
A further explanation could be that individual cyclists felt that when there were more 
pedestrians there was a higher risk of collision. The measure of pedestrians included the 
number of pedestrians crossing the road whilst the light was red. It could be the case that 
there were either a higher number of pedestrians in the road leading to cyclists being less 
likely to jump the light to avoid a collision or a higher number of pedestrians on the 
pavement close to the crossing who might decide to cross the road at any moment, which 
might also lead to a collision. In order to disentangle the effects of actual risk of collision 
and social risk of being seen jumping an alternative study might need to be done, where, for 
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example, variation in light jumping behaviour is studied with no pedestrians crossing. Or 
variation in light jumping behaviour where the number of pedestrians is held constant.  
Whilst cyclists seem to change their behaviour with the number of pedestrians present they 
are unaffected by the number of vehicles. The power analysis that I carried out prior to 
beginning formal observational work suggests that I should be able to detect this effect 
reliably (Table 5.1, Table 5.2). There could be several explanations for this result. Several 
sociologists have suggested that in the urban landscape pedestrians and cyclists do not view 
motor vehicles as people but instead see them as objects (Taylor, 2003). This could explain 
why cyclists perhaps do not view cars as a social risk to their reputations, and thus do not 
respond to them in this way. However, motor vehicles also pose a higher actual risk of 
dangerous collision to cyclists than pedestrians. It is therefore interesting that cyclists do not 
adjust their behaviour according to a change in actual risk. Possible explanations for this 
could include that this study took place at pedestrian crossings. At such crossings the cost of 
breaking traffic laws for motorists is high if observed by a police officer or caught on CCTV, 
this means that motorists may be more likely to behave in a predictably less risky way. Not 
only is the punishment for motorists higher than for cyclists breaking traffic rules but the risk 
of causing significant injury to cyclists and pedestrians is substantially higher for motorists. 
Again meaning that motorists are more likely to behave in a predictable way at pedestrian 
crossings. This may mean that cyclists do not pay a great deal of attention to them. It would 
be interesting to investigate the role of attention in how cyclists go about making cooperative 
decisions in this context. Finally, cyclists apparent lack of regard for changes in actual risk 
provides some support for the concept that it is changes in social risk that is driving their 
behaviour change with varying numbers of pedestrians. 
When individuals are exposed to circumstantial evidence, like faeces, this tells them little 
about the actual proportion of individuals cheating, or even the number of people playing the 
game. However, when directly observing behaviour an actor has a clear idea of the 
proportion of cheats. 
For my second hypothesis that cyclists will copy both the jumping and stopping behaviour of 
preceding cyclists my results are less clear cut. I addressed the question in two ways. Firstly, 
I carried out a natural experiment by restricting my dataset to instances where the focal 
cyclist either jumped or stopped and was followed by a number of other cyclists. In this 
experiment both jumping and stopping appeared to have a significant effect on the behaviour 
of following cyclists. Secondly, I carried out an experiment where a stooge cyclist stopped at 
a red light and I observed the behaviour of following cyclists. I was unable to carry out a 
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jumping experiment as this is illegal and would breach ethical guidelines.  In this second 
experiment the stooge had no effect and experimental subjects jumped at the same rate as 
controls  
Explaining these two, somewhat conflicting, results is complex. The first result implies that 
there is some type of social contagion occurring and cyclists are jumping more when they 
see others jump and stopping more when they see others stop. However, there could be 
several other explanations for this behaviour. For example, there could be a bystander effect 
where all following cyclists are effectively bystanders and simply copy whatever the first 
cyclist has done as being the local norm. There is a subtle difference between these two 
explanations. In social contagion an individual will emulate another’s behaviour, how 
frequently this happens can change linearly with the number of individuals. In the bystander 
effect, there is a threshold where new individuals arriving may detect a social norm and the 
change in behaviour may not change linearly with the number of individuals performing the 
behaviour. The “safety in numbers” hypothesis could also apply with cyclists feeling safer in 
undertaking a more risky behaviour like light jumping when others are already doing it 
(Jacobsen, 2015). An alternative explanation, which could account for the second result, is 
that cyclists are all making independent decisions based on similar cues. So when these cues 
are conducive to light jumping behaviour more cyclists are likely to jump. For example, the 
only significant explanatory variable in the model I used to analyse the stopping experiment 
was pedestrian density (Table 5.5). A final factor that may be important when considering 
these results is that we may be missing some social effects as a result of physical barriers. 
For example, although in my stopping experiment having a stopped stooge cyclist at the 
lights did not lead to a reduction in jumping behaviour, it could be the case in my naturalistic 
experiment that absence of stopped cyclist may have led to more jumping behaviour in the 
naturalistic experiment. 
In this chapter I made use of a simulation to analyse how much data I needed to collect to 
detect real effects. This technique was enormously useful as it allowed me to establish 
rigorously how much data would be sufficient prior to beginning formal observation work. 
This meant that my data collection was both more efficient and my results more reliable. 
There were other parts of this study that were less strong, a formal stopping experiment 
would have established the causality of jumping and stopping behaviour in cyclists but this 
was not possible due to legal and ethical constraints. 
In conclusion, cyclists show a clear preference for jumping more when there are fewer 
pedestrians present, however, more work would be required to establish if this behaviour is 
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as a result of their perception of collison risk or to protect their social reputations. It is 
unclear whether social contagion is influencing cyclists’ decisions to jump red lights, 
although my initial naturalistic experiment suggests that this may be the case, there could 
also be a number of other explanations and my formal stopping experiment did not 



















































The success of human society is arguably due to our ability to cooperate with non-relatives, 
despite selection to cheat (Dunbar, 2003). There are several mechanisms which have been 
identified which stabilise cooperation, chiefly, reciprocity and punishment (West, Griffin, & 
Gardner, 2007). The studies I have reported examined variation in cooperative behaviour and 
the extent to which cooperation is stabilised by these effects. Here, I will: (1) Briefly 
summarise my key findings; (2) Discuss their implications; (3) Discuss my methodology and 
future research directions; (4) Discuss potential applications of this work. 
6.1 Key findings  
6.1.1 Chapter 2 
 
I showed unambiguously that both context and the level of pay-off affect cooperative 
decisions. First, people behave very differently in laboratory and natural environments given 
similar pay-offs, with people giving at a much lower frequency outside the laboratory. 
Furthermore, I showed that people’s perception of their pay-off matters when they make 
cooperative decisions, for example, whether the money they are giving is a recent windfall or 
earned money. When pedestrians are given a small endowment their rate of cooperation 
increases, even when they are not under observation. If participants are given a small 
endowment whilst under direct observation in the street, their rate of cooperation becomes 
very high, with people giving at a higher frequency than is seen in the laboratory. 
6.1.2 Chapter 3  
 
I showed that several social effects correlate with cooperative behaviour. For example, 
pedestrians were far more likely to give when on their own than when in a group. 
Furthermore, crowd density was important: donation frequency declined as the density of 
pedestrians on a street increased. The type of recipient made a difference too: charitable 
collectors received donations at higher rates than both buskers and mendicants, with 
mendicants receiving the least. In this study I also examined the effect of social contagion by 
testing whether experimental donations to mendicants induced donation behaviour. 
Experimental donations did not yield an increase in donation rate by pedestrians. 
Additionally, I examined whether the sexes cooperated differently. I found that men gave 





6.1.3 Chapter 4 
 
The experiments and observations yielded very few results that differed from my null 
hypotheses. For example, faeces abandonment appeared to be independent of house price, 
percentage house ownership, number of dogs, and number of dog walkers. However, The 
absence of a relationship between the number of dogs and level of dog faeces does indicate 
that there was some type of human social game being played, the exact nature of which 
remains unclear. Furthermore, faecal abandonment was not affected by experimental 
manipulation of dog fouling, suggesting that people  are not sensitive to evidence of 
variation in cheating by others.  . When I investigated additional socio-demographic factors 
using a multivariate analysis with a number of further predictor variables, the only one of 
these that was correlated with faeces abandonment was distance of a park from a primary 
school. 
6.1.4 Chapter 5 
 
I directly observed immediate responses to the actions of others, as opposed to circumstantial 
evidence of their previous behaviour. Cyclists were less likely to jump red lights as 
pedestrian density increased. The density of vehicles in the same area did not have an effect. 
When I investigated how cyclists were influenced by other cyclists’ behaviour, cyclists were 
likely to follow the lead cyclist’s behaviour, with 24% jumping when the lead cyclist jumped 
and 6% jumping when the lead cyclist stopped. However, experimental stopping by a lead 
cyclist had no effect on the rate of jumping. 
6.2 Broad Significance  
6.2.1 Getting out of the lab: simple economic games in the laboratory transfer poorly to 
the field  
 
Chapter 2 unambiguously demonstrates that the context and pay-offs of a decision are both 
important. Meanwhile, results from my remaining chapters demonstrate that social effects 
can influence cooperative behaviour in natural systems and that pragmatic, pay-off, based 
explanations may account for much variation in wild cooperative behaviour. Whilst 
laboratory studies often try to control these variables, if they are, in fact, the main drivers of 
cooperative behaviour in natural situations this makes conclusions drawn in the laboratory 
very difficult to generalise as we cannot have an appreciation of how these decisions might 
change when participants are not in a laboratory context. 
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6.2.2 Prosociality is over-emphasised 
 
My findings generally support traditional economic theory (Rankin, 2011). I have not found 
that people behave in an unexpectedly prosocial manner, or that subtle cues of others 
investment in a public goods game change behaviour. Whilst my findings certainly 
demonstrate a level of social dependence in cooperative decision-making, they also show 
that people will behave in an economically rational selfish way when they do not believe that 
this will damage their reputation. A decision, which is, in itself, economically rational. 
This work generally supports conventional evolutionary theory that cooperation is 
problematic and requires a mechanism such as reputation or punishment to be maintained 
(West et al., 2007). It does not support the idea that people are unexpectedly prosocial 
(Burton-Chellew & West, 2012). However, some of my results do suggest that people are 
socially influenced when making cooperative decisions. These results provide evidence for 
the idea that reputational information can stabilise cooperative behaviour through 
reciprocity.  
6.3 Specific Implications 
6.3.1 The difference between lab and field: The importance of context 
 
Overall, my studies clearly demonstrate the importance of context in cooperative behaviour. 
Evolutionary theory predicts that individuals should only cooperate when they gain a net 
benefit by doing so (West, Pen, & Griffin, 2002). In contexts where it does not pay to 
cooperate, we expect lower levels of cooperation. Changing the context changes the potential 
pay-offs available to decision-makers (Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew and West, 2012). For 
example, wherever reputation can influence the decisions of future partners there is selection 
for maintaining a cooperative reputation (Cuesta et al., 2015). In humans, where reputational 
effects appear to be both common and powerful (Fu et al., 2008; List, 2006; Yoeli et al., 
2013), this may profoundly influence the outcome of laboratory games:  individuals in labs 
may consciously ‘know’ that they are anonymous, but they are also aware that they are under 
observation. This may therefore trigger innate responses, making them more likely to 
cooperate (Burton-Chellew & West, 2012). In a natural setting, individuals are not 
necessarily aware that their behaviour is being observed, so perceived reputational damage is 
lower, and they may behave less cooperatively. It is perhaps unsurprising that we see lower 
levels of cooperation in natural settings, as in chapter 2. The effect of direct observation is 
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clear in the experiment where volunteers played a dictator game in the street. In this 
experiment a very large proportion of participants chose to give.  
Context can also change in other ways, for example, in chapter 3, I analyse the differences in 
donation frequency towards mendicants, buskers and charitable collectors. Amongst these 
recipients, buskers are arguably engaging in a reciprocal interaction with donors as they are 
providing a service that donors choose to pay for. Buskers accordingly received a higher 
frequency of donations than mendicants. Charitable collectors received a higher still 
proportion of donations. This may be because individuals perceived this as a more reliable or 
socially acceptable recipient, so effectively, their reputation might be better maintained by 
donating to a charitable collector than a mendicant (Lee and Farrell, 2003). 
6.3.2 Cooperation in crowds observers and companions matter  
 
Beyond simply demonstrating the profound differences between laboratory and natural 
contexts, my results show that cooperation is influenced by the presence of others. The most 
important effects are those of group size and density. People are far more likely to give when 
they are on their own rather than in a group. This effect is seen clearly in the study of giving 
to mendicants. Street donations to mendicants are contentious, and some people strongly 
disagree with it (Lee and Farrell, 2003). Individuals might therefore view choosing to give 
when they are in the company of others as potentially risky to their reputations. 
Alternatively, they might just be distracted. More interesting, is the effect of pedestrian 
density on behaviour. In chapter 3, people are more likely to donate to mendicants when 
there is a lower density of pedestrians. This may be caused by a diffusion of responsibility 
(Kautz et al., 2016) . Diffusion of responsibility might underlie well documented phenomena 
like the bystander effect (Darley and Latane, 1968). This could also be an ultimate 
explanation for the propagation of social norms as once there is a social norm in place, no 
one individual bears the responsibility of adjusting their behaviour (Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2004).  
Similarly, in chapter 5, cyclists were less likely to jump the lights when there were more 
pedestrians around. Again this can be explained using a public goods argument. When there 
are more pedestrians around, the risk of reputational damage and the risk of hitting a 
pedestrian and being injured are greater, so the cyclist might choose not to jump the lights as 
it is no longer worth it (Bjørnskau, 2015). The fact that there appears to be some social 
contagion in light jumping behaviour can be similarly explained. If there is another person 
jumping the lights, the reputational costs of this behaviour may be reduced as they are spread 
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over a larger number of people (Christakis and Fowler, 2010). Again, increasing the 
incentive to jump. 
6.3.3 Social strategy is not everything: ecological payoffs matter 
 
Despite the temptation to invoke adaptive strategic explanations for variation in cooperation, 
my results indicate that much variation may instead be driven by immediate convenience – 
local idiosyncrasies of time, space or demography that alter the immediate payoffs of 
selfishness.  People might just decide whether to cooperate or not based on what is 
convenient for them at that moment. This broadly conforms with basic evolutionary and 
economic theory, since ‘convenience’ amounts to a lowering of the direct cost of 
cooperation. (West et al., 2007). Two examples from my data stand out: 
1) In chapter 4, I found higher rates of dog fouling near primary schools. This may 
simply be driven by temporal constraints: families with limited time may combine 
dropping off children at school with exercising their dog, leading to lazy faeces 
collection in parks near schools.  
2) In chapter 2, I recorded people donating to mendicants at a higher rate when they 
have just picked up some money off the street. This might simply be because they 
happen to have some money in their hand and do not have to go through the hassle 
of removing some from their pocket or purse. 
6.3.4 Non-adaptive explanations 
 
While my results show variation in cooperation that is predicted by evolutionary or 
economic theory, it is critical to note that there is unexplained variation. It is possible that 
much of this variation has no adaptive explanation, and is simply the product of error in 
perception or decision making by actors, and errors in assumption or measurement by 
investigators. For example, the role of attention in facilitating cooperation has not been 
widely discussed. This is particularly relevant to Chapter 2, where people must first notice a 
mendicant soliciting for donations in order to be able to decide whether or not to donate. 
This means that some who did not donate might have done had they noticed the mendicant, 
while the investigator is forced to assume perfect knowledge in all subjects. 
This may seem like a trivial point but it highlights the crucial difference between work in the 
laboratory and the field. Datasets, like mine, that have been collected in the field are the only 
way to observe the variation caused by actors making errors that are specific to real contexts, 
like not paying attention to mendicants. Variation in error is likely to be context specific. For 
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example, error in laboratory results may be driven by participants’ confusion about rules or 
pay-offs (Burton-Chellew, El Mouden and West, 2016).  
While unknown or unmeasured constraints on perception and processing by actors may 
introduce error into data sets like these, the constraints may themselves be adaptive. Simply 
put, selection may have influenced both which cues actors attend to, and the intensity of their 
responses. This may explain the positive effect on cooperation that experiments like the 
“seeing-eye” posters produce (Nettle, Nott and Bateson, 2012). Understanding the adaptive 
origins of sensory and cognitive constraints, and the extent to which they drive variation in 
cooperation will be a very fruitful line of future enquiry, and may help to resolve cooperation 
dilemmas in applied settings (Dunbar, 2003). For example, if the average person can only 
recall reputational information for up to 150 people, attempting to use reputational concerns 
to resolve cooperative dilemmas which involve more than 150 people may be a fruitless 
activity.  
6.4 Methodological comments 
6.4.1 Lessons learned and the implications for future empirical work 
 
Designing and conducting these studies revealed a number of important considerations for 
future attempts to carry out ecologically valid assessments of human behaviour: 
6.4.1.1 Pilot data 
 
Collecting pilot data and optimising experimental procedures is essential. All experiments 
were carried out in a field environment where there is likely to be much more unexplained 
variation that cannot be controlled (Levitt & List, 2007). 
6.4.1.2 Replication 
 
It is important to consider how much data is sufficient to answer an empirical question. 
Replication allowed me to sample variation in behaviour both within treatments and across 
contexts. Replicating my studies within treatments allowed me to analyse the average 
behaviour of a group rather than the behaviour of specific individuals. Statistically, this is a 
more powerful approach, and allows insight into variation in cooperative behaviour. 
Meanwhile replication of studies across contexts allowed me to establish the importance of 
the particular pay-offs associated with cooperative behaviour in these contexts. For example, 
replicating the dictator game in a natural context seriously calls into question the 
generalisability of laboratory findings. Meanwhile, carrying out multiple studies of public 
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goods game, but recording different types of variable allowed me to draw conclusions about 
what caused different results in these two different contexts. 
6.4.1.3 Discreet observation 
 
I made extensive use of discreet observation of human behaviour. Whilst, at times, 
challenging, this approach was a highly powerful one. It allowed me to gather large 
quantitative datasets pertaining to my research questions but more importantly allowed me to 
collect data on individuals who were unaware that they were being observed. This in turn, 
has allowed me to both critique the status quo but also allowed me to rigorously investigate 
the role that reputation plays in human cooperative decision-making. 
6.4.2 Future Directions 
 
6.4.2.1 Cross-cultural studies. 
  
Finding behavioural paradigms that translate across cultures and establishing whether there 
are patterns that hold across all people. If there are consistent patterns this may be indicative 
of some absolute constraint in our evolution or cognitive abilities. If there is cross-cultural 
variation this may be indicative of the presence of different drivers for cooperation in 
different places (Dunbar, 1993; Rand, Greene and Nowak, 2012). Understanding what 
causes this variation between cultures might help us better understand what drives 
cooperation in the first instance. It would also be fascinating to understand the effect that 
greater global connectivity has on cooperation both at a local and international level. The 
implications of this type of research could be far reaching for both social policy and 
international law. It may be that because of particular local norms a legal framework that 
would work well in one place may be inappropriate in another. Alternatively, international 
law could be designed to accommodate different cooperative norms. 
6.4.2.2 Large scale, longitudinal quantitative datasets based on standardised protocols. 
  
My experimental design emphasised generating datasets large enough to answer my 
questions, but if funding were available to gain insight at a truly population level the results 
might be remarkable. The additional insights that can be drawn on animal populations using 
such long term datasets are substantial (Clutton-Brock & Sheldon, 2010). The types of 
questions that could be asked at this scale could include: (1) If and how cooperation has 
changed over time and what has driven these changes. (2) Why trends in cooperative 
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behaviour like recycling have changed? Do Local Authority initiatives work? (3) Could we 
apply these lessons to other scenarios? (4) Does crowd density have an effect on behaviour? 
Could this be important for safety at sports matches, concerts and airports? (5) Does people’s 
individual behaviour change with age?  There is also the possibility of using data from online 
interactions. This type of data could be easy to collect, especially within social media 
organisations (Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012). This approach may be an extremely 
fruitful line of inquiry, however, I think it would be fascinating to establish how individuals’ 
online behaviour matches up to their real life behaviour (Dunbar, 2016). Furthermore, it 
would be very interesting to know how people feel consciously about the pay-offs of their 
online behaviour and if this influences their online and real life decision-making and if 
indeed these things may be inextricably linked. 
6.4.2.3 Quantitative studies that identify the instantaneous drivers of decision-making 
  
My results that demonstrate that decision-making can be density dependent in chapters 3 and 
5 suggests that transient social effects can shift behaviour significantly. The difference in 
results between chapters 4 and 5 might also lend support to this idea. In these chapters I 
studied two different public goods games with the key difference being that in chapter 4 I 
looked at how the evidence of others decisions influenced cooperation summed over a 
lengthy time period, whilst in chapter 5 I observed the conditions surrounding the focal 
decision-makers as they made their decisions. In chapter 4 I did not detect any social effects 
whilst in chapter 5 I detected several. This might be evidence that the social context at the 
moment of decision-making is key.  
6.4.2.4The role that attention might play, or more simply how effectively individuals are 
picking up information. 
 
This could affect their cooperative decisions in a non-linear way. For example, having a 
small amount more information may change how much people cooperate, whilst having a 
large amount of information may not change this cooperation additionally.  I think it would 
be fascinating to see studies that attempt to address these kinds of issues, again in a 
naturalistic context, and quantify the cooperative outcomes. I think it would be interesting to 
establish what drives what people pay attention to. It would be key to identify contexts 
where the experimenter can manipulate fines or reputational concerns and establish how this 
adjusts attention. Littering would be an obvious context where this could be studied. 
However, other examples could include how the roll out of charges for plastic bags has 





At a local level, this research has a high potential to be applied. For example, having an 
understanding of what drives dog fouling could be key in reducing it. My study suggested 
that none of my hypothesised variables correlated with dog fouling, apart from possibly 
proximity to primary schools. This might allow local councils to, for example, target areas 
near primary schools for increased monitoring or fining of dog fouling behaviour. Similarly, 
my work on cyclists suggests an alternative policy might handle cyclist/pedestrian 
interactions at crossings better. Cyclists are clearly jumping at a relatively high rate, given 
the illegality of this behaviour. If there are insufficient funds to dramatically increase 
policing of this behaviour an alternative approach might be to change the legal framework 
surrounding crossings and to categorise cyclists separately to vehicles. It could be made legal 
for cyclists to cross at the lights under certain frameworks. 
Finally, setting this in a global context. Human cooperation and specifically public goods 
games underlie many of the world’s largest problems (Milinski et al., 2006). This thesis 
suggests that the key determinants of cooperative behaviour are social context and the actual 
pay-offs that individuals receive. This is enormously powerful knowledge when considering 
how to persuade people to change their behaviour. For example, by encouraging people to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and thus counter the effects of climate change. If you 
know that the main ways to change behaviour are through pay-offs and reputational gain, 
you can explicitly reward people for using lower carbon technologies, by providing subsidies 
for purchasing electrical cars or purchasing their electricity from sustainable providers. The 
flip side of this would be to punish unsustainable behaviour, as initiatives like the congestion 
charging effectively do. Reputational benefits could be enhanced by essentially making 
environmentally friendly behaviour “cool” such that individuals not engaging in it receive 
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Sex effect Models 
When all the data are analysed with an interaction between the type of focal recipient and the 
sex of the donor, donor sex has no effect on behaviour. However, this interaction is non-
significant and when dropped, a significant effect emerges with single males giving at 82% 
of the rate of single females. When different types of focal are analysed separately it 
becomes clear that this effect is almost entirely driven by a strongly significant difference in 
donation behaviour towards charitable collectors, with males giving at 69.9% the rate of 
females. 
Singletons Model with Sex:Type interaction (n=26489) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
Intercept 0.052 (0.033, 0.083) -12.544 2 x 10-16 
Pedestrian Sex: 
Male 
0.832 (0.659, 1.047) -1.589 0.1121 
Type: Charity 1.271 (0.799, 2.000) 1.048 0.2945 
Type: Mendicant 0.409 (0.282, 0.597) -4.765 1.88 x 10-6 
Focal Sex: Male 1.000 (0.690, 1.446) 0.002 0.9986 
Rain: Light 0.997 (0.693, 1.428) -0.015 0.9877 
Rain: Heavy 1.392 (0.338, 5.361) 0.480 0.6311 
Density 0.978 (0.962, 0.995) -2.552 0.0107 
Pedestrian Sex: 
Male* Type: Charity 




1.154 (0.798, 0.647) 0.807 0.4196 
Random Effects Variance Standard Deviation  
Session 0.09586 0.3096  
Location 0.13384 0.3658  







Singletons Model without Sex:Type interaction (n=26489) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
Intercept 0.052 (0.033, 0.083) -12.669 < 2 x 10-16 
Pedestrian Sex: 
Male 
0.820 (0.709, 0.947) -2.737 0.0062 
Focal Sex: Male 1.000 (0.689, 1.445) -0.002 0.9981 
Type: Charity 1.184 (0.761, 1.826) 0.773 0.4394 
Type: Mendicant 0.438 (0.313, 0.616) -4.898 9.67 x 10-7 
Rain: Light 0.998 (0.693, 1.430) -0.011 0.9909 
Rain: Heavy 1.389 (0.336, 5.731) 0.474 0.6352 
Density 0.978 (0.961, 0.995) -2.562 0.0104 
Random Effects Variance Standard Deviation  
Session 0.09551 0.3090  
Location 0.13557 0.3682  
Date 0.05646 0.2376  
 
Mendicant Singletons Model (n=13427) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
Intercept 0.028 (0.014, 0.056) -9.958 < 2 x 10-16 
Pedestrian Sex: 
Male 
0.958 (0.736, 1.248) -0.316 0.7524 
Focal Sex: Male 0.870 (0.475, 1.593) -0.450 0.6526 
Rain: Light 0.915 (0.490, 1.707) -0.280 0.7797 
Rain: Heavy 1.215 (0.284, 5.204) 0.263 0.7926 
Density 0.966 (0.937, 0.996) -2.218 0.0266 
Random Effects Variance Standard Deviation  
Session 0.09006 0.3001  
Date 0.13240 0.3639  




Busker Singletons Model (n=8270) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
Intercept 0.044 (0.023, 0.083) -9.511 < 2 x 10-16 
Pedestrian Sex: 
Male 
0.830 (0.658, 1.044) -0.602 0.109 
Focal Sex: Male 1.018 (0.585, 1.770) 0.065 0.948 
Rain: Light 0.670 (0.326, 1.333) -1.152 0.249 
Density 0.997 (0.969, 1.025) -0.230 0.818 
Random Effects Variance Standard Deviation  
Session 0.1868 0.4322  
Date 0.0285 0.1688  
 
Charitable Collector Singletons Model (n=4792) 
Fixed Effect Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
z Statistic P(z) 
Intercept 0.044 (0.015, 0.125) -6.327 2.51 x10-10 
Pedestrian Sex: 
Male 
0.699 (0.538, 0.902) -2.737 0.0062 
Focal Sex: Male 1.759 (0.551, 5.010) 1.105 0.2693 
Rain: Light 1.079 (0.730, 1.657) 0.382 0.7028 
Density 0.972 (0.943, 1.003) -1.807 0.0708 
Random Effects Variance Standard Deviation  
Session 0.03313 0.182  
















































Campbell Park Addition 
Meadowspot Park Addition 
Morningside Park Addition 
King George V Park (Currie) Addition 
Malleny Park Addition 
Newcraighall Park Addition 
Clermiston Park Addition 
Redhall Park Addition 
Bingham Park Addition 
Lochend Park Addition 
Regent Road Park Addition 
Mortonhall Community Park Control 
Seven Acre Park Control 
Abercorn Park Control 
Blinkbonny Park Control 
Starbank Park Control 
Fernieside Recreation Ground Control 
Leith Links Control 
Moredun Park Control 
Calton Hill Control 
Gypsy Brae Control 
Braidburn Valley Park Removal 
Davidsons Mains Park Removal 
Easter Craiglockhart Hill Removal 
Allison Park Removal 
Joppa Quarry Park Removal 
East Pilton Park Removal 
Ratho Station Park Removal 
West Pilton Park Removal 
Hunters Hall Park Removal 
Murieston Park Removal 











































Making Artificial Dog Faeces 
I investigated purchasing fake faeces. These were costly and unconvincing. I was also 
concerned about the environmental consequences of leaving out plastic faeces for extended 
periods of time. Instead I manufactured fake faeces, which were more convincing, 
environmentally friendly and would not poisonous. I generated three prototypes and 
subjected them to an informal survey of 20 peers. Respondents agreed unanimously that 
prototype 3 was the most convincing fake dog faeces. 
Prototype 1: This was made of plaster of paris poured into a shape that approximated soft 
dog faeces. It was spray painted with mushroom coloured spray paint. This prototype looked 
too consistent. It was advantageous in that plaster of paris is relatively inert once set and 








Prototype 2: This prototype was made of plumbers foam sprayed into a shape that 
approximated dog faeces and sprayed with mushroom coloured spray paint. This prototype 
had several problems: (i) they were very shiny; (ii) they were quite large and size was 
difficult to control; (iii) plumbers foam might be toxic to dogs  (iv) they were very light and 












Prototype 3: This prototype was made up of porridge oats and watered down PVA glue. 
Aliquots of the oat glue mix were rolled into sausages of varying thicknesses. The sausages 
were then shaped into faecal shapes. This prototype had a heterogeneous texture and I could 
easily vary the size of faeces to represent a variety of dog sizes. Porridge oats and PVA are 










































































Means and Standard Errors for Total Faeces and Total Dogs 
 
Mean Total 
Faeces SE Total Faeces Mean Dogs SE Dogs 
Abercorn Park 2.5 0.6454972 16.75 2.4958299
Allison Park 
(Kirkliston) 5.75 1.0307764 1.25 0.75
Bingham Park 3.25 1.0307764 4.25 1.652019
Blinkbonny Park 9.5 0.8660254 1 0.4082483
Braidburn 
Valley Park 6.25 0.75 11.5 3.6628768
Calton Hill 1 0.4082483 1.75 0.4787136
Campbell Park 2 0.4082483 1.5 0.5
Clermiston Park 1.5 0.2886751 1.5 1.1902381
Davidson's Main 
Park 4.25 1.9737865 11.25 1.4361407
E Pilton Park 17 4.8476799 3.75 0.6291529
Easter 
Craiglockhart 
Hill 4 0.4082483 8.5 1.9364917
Fernieside 
Recreation 
Ground 29 4.8131764 3.5 1.9364917
Gypsy Brae 30.25 3.705289 9 2.9439203
Hunters Hall 
Park 13 1.0801234 2 0.7071068
Joppa Quarry 
Park 16 2.3452079 5.25 2.3584953
King George V  
Park (Curry) 8 2.0412415 2.75 0.8539126
Leith Links 14.5 1.9364917 8.25 1.4930394
Lochend Park 6.5 1.7078251 14.75 1.3149778
Malleny Park 0.25 0.25 0 0
Meadowspot 
Park 5.75 0.75 2.25 0.9464847
Moredun Park 31.25 2.5289985 3.75 0.75
Morningside 
Park 21.5 3.5 4.5 2.0207259
Mortonhall 
Community 
Park 13.25 1.25 3.5 1.3228757
Murieston Park 15.5 0.6454972 3.5 0.2886751
Newcraighall 
Park 12.5 1.3228757 3 1.0801234
Princes St 
Gardens 0.75 0.25 1.5 0.9574271
Ratho Station 
Park 15 2.7386128 2.75 0.8539126
Redhall Park 4 1.0801234 7.5 1.5
Regent Road 
Park 30.75 1.1086779 2 0.4082483
































Starbank Park 8.75 2.3584953 1.25 0.9464847































































Locations of crossings for observations on cyclists 
Site Location Post Code 
Leith Walk EH6 8NY 
Raeburn Place EH4 1HH 
Brougham Place EH3 9HW 
Bruntsfield Place EH10 4ER 
Buccleuch Street EH8 9NG 
Causewayside EH9 1QG 
Lauriston Place EH3 9EQ 
Nicolson Street EH8 9EH 
Rankeillor Street EH8 9JB 
St. Leonards EH8 9QY 
